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Abstract 
Current policies leveraging financial incentives and improved irrigation efficiency to mitigate 
groundwater scarcity have not proven to curtail trends of resource depletion.  Groundwater 
benefits cannot be appropriately valued solely on market forces, and so deeper policy 
consideration is warranted under a framework that considers the importance of groundwater 
across all its values to society.  Understanding time preferences for groundwater management 
and preferences for alternative policies is vital to inform efficient policies.  Furthermore, climate 
change remains politically controversial yet has important consequences for critical groundwater 
resources and their sustainable long-term management.  Proliferating policy narratives 
concerning climate change could influence the way people think about managing groundwater 
resources.  I present three empirical studies that address these issues.  Chapter I examines 
irrigation efficiency technologies for improved outcomes using a market-based, spatially-
dynamic optimization model to test the limitations of improvements alone and in tandem with 
typical environmental policy mechanisms.  Improved efficiency induces some producers to plant 
more of water-intensive crops such as rice, and best-case improvements fail to counter trends of 
groundwater depletion over a 30-year horizon.  Chapter II elicits public willingness to pay 
(WTP) for long-term groundwater management and for market and non-market groundwater 
services.  I employ time-discounted choice models to endogenously estimate time preferences 
under different forms of discounting.  This is the first non-market valuation to estimate 
heterogeneity in time preferences using flexible mixing distributions.  I find significant WTP for 
water quality provision, buffer against long-term drought, jobs from agriculture, and provision of 
wildlife habitat that promotes fishing and duck hunting, while most people display evidence of 
hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic discounting.  Individual parameter distributions for WTP and 
 
time preferences are not normally distributed.  Chapter III continues the Narrative Policy 
Framework (NPF) tradition to test for systematic influences of narrative frames about climate 
change on elicited groundwater and policy preferences.  In a Choice Experiment (CE), some 
respondents were exposed to a structuralist, culturally-biased narrative frame about climate 
change and groundwater resources.  Using theories about cultural risk perception and motivated 
reasoning for systematic evaluation, I find evidence for a cultural incongruency effect but no 
evidence for a congruency effect.  This suggests that people could respond more strongly to 
incongruence than to congruence in the case of groundwater policy preferences. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 Current policies to mitigate groundwater scarcity mostly involve voluntary incentive 
programs that target agricultural users because they hold long-term financial interests linked to 
groundwater availability.  However, aquifer depletion continues and even accelerates in many 
agricultural production regions despite current management efforts (Konikow, 2015; Schaible 
and Aillery, 2012), warranting deeper policy consideration.  Efficient policies consider values to 
society rather than only to the marketplace.  The benefits of groundwater cannot be appropriately 
valued solely on market forces, and a better framework considers the importance of groundwater 
across all of its values to society.  Frameworks for valuing natural resource benefits would also 
profit by considering the potential differences in valuation that might arise under alternative 
policy contexts, because circumstances influence the value people ascribe to a good or service. 
 One critical issue that is likely to be germane to any potential environmental policy 
context is global climate change.  The climate change issue remains politically controversial in 
the United States (US) yet has important consequences for critical groundwater resources and 
their sustainable long-term management.  In confluence with this fact, proliferation of policy 
narratives concerning climate change could meaningfully influence the way people think about 
managing groundwater resources. 
 Another issue that is present across environmental policy debates is how to discount 
future benefits and costs associated with environmental resources and their management.  The 
use of differently sized discount rates in policy analyses can lead to the estimation of drastically 
different net present values, and there is limited evidence about the magnitude and nature of time 
preferences within groundwater or other policy contexts.  Debates continue as to whether people 
discount future values equally near the present and far in the future, or whether they exhibit time-
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dynamic discounting with rates that decline over time.  Like the magnitude of the discount rate, 
the selection of functional forms for discounting future values in policy analyses could influence 
the size of estimated present values.  This, in turn, may determine whether or not to implement 
potential policy alternatives.           
 I present three separate empirical studies related to groundwater management policy that 
examine details about the issues presented above.  These articles contribute to three very 
different bodies of literature, but are linked in their associations to the benefit-cost framework 
with the recognition that physical and social realities of groundwater resources management 
inherently force tradeoffs between (and among) benefits and costs and place them to be central 
factors in both evaluating policies and understanding policy preferences.  Chapter I examines 
how new technology (remote sensing using unmanned aerial vehicles) facilitates improved 
groundwater outcomes, and I use market-based, spatially-dynamic optimization to test the 
limitations of these improvements alone and in tandem with typical environmental policy 
mechanisms.  Chapter II elicits public willingness to pay (WTP) for long-term groundwater 
management alternatives and for market and non-market groundwater services.  I use time-
discounted choice models to endogenously estimate time preferences under different forms of 
discounting.  This is the first non-market valuation to estimate heterogeneity in time preferences 
using flexible mixing distributions free of the constraints imposed when fitting random variables 
to common pre-defined distributions (Train, 2016).  Chapter III extends the tradition of the 
Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) to test for systematic influences of narrative frames about 
climate change on elicited groundwater and policy preferences.  I use a Choice Experiment (CE) 
where some respondents were exposed to a structuralist, culturally-biased narrative frame about 
climate change and groundwater resources. 
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 The remaining portion of this introduction devotes greater attention to the motivation for 
studying groundwater resource problems within the Mississippi River Valley Alluvial Aquifer 
(MRVA), the environmental context to each of these empirical studies.  I elaborate on the 
objectives of each chapter and provide brief reviews of situating literature.  Each empirical 
chapter also includes its own, more comprehensive, literature review. 
 The degradation and depletion of water systems is a growing problem worldwide that 
threatens the sustainability of social, environmental, and economic systems.  In particular, many 
important groundwater aquifer systems such as the MRVA in the Lower Mississippi River Basin 
(LMRB) exhibit long-term water-level declines due to sustained groundwater pumping for 
irrigated agriculture.  The consequences of this are multifaceted: increased pumping costs, 
decreased discharge to streams and rivers, decreased water quality, increased land subsidence, 
and decreased storage capacity.  Ultimately, groundwater overdraft threatens the economic 
viability of irrigated agriculture in the LMRB, where it is a leading driver of economic activity.  
In the state of Arkansas where the eastern Delta region overlies a dominant portion of the 
MRVA, the trend of groundwater depletion threatens over $4.5 billion in annual farm income 
from irrigated crop production (USDA, 2014). 
 Many of the other social benefits threatened by groundwater depletion are non-market 
benefits.  The values that people attribute to non-market groundwater services are less 
straightforward to quantify, but understanding the relationship between policy preferences and 
non-market groundwater benefits is important for policy makers, stakeholders, and the public 
who need to balance existing interactions between different water uses in weighing policy 
alternatives to address water scarcity issues.  Evidence of the ways that groundwater resource 
attributes influence perceptions about costs and benefits enriches policy analysis and provides 
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valuable data for policy evaluation.  In a study that integrates institutional rational choice theory 
and the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to explain actor perceptions about a common-
pool resource dilemma, greater congruence between values and alternatives has been shown to 
increase perceptions of policy effectiveness, promoting cooperation and implementation success 
(Lubell, 2003).  Policy evaluations should recognize as an important criterion the degree to 
which potential alternatives conform to community values.  
  The underlying goal of Chapter I is to examine the potential for improved groundwater 
outcomes via policy programs that offer financial incentives to agricultural producers to adopt 
new water-saving technologies and practices.  I construct an integrated environmental-economic 
model that incorporates spatial dynamics of the landscape and groundwater environments and 
includes feedbacks in modeling production decisions.  I compare two technologies, soil moisture 
sensors and unmanned aerial systems (UAS), for cost-effectiveness and net return per acre-foot 
of aquifer retention.  I also compare outcomes with and without the presence of other best 
management practices (BMPs), allowing for the construction of on-farm reservoirs and tailwater 
recovery systems to help reduce pumping costs and promote aquifer recharge.  To test the 
robustness of findings, I include a sensitivity analysis of simulated outcomes using a range of 
different assumptions about technology costs, given that some of these costs are uncertain.  
Finally, I compare typical incentive-based environmental policies such as cost-share programs 
and pumping fees for improved water management and aquifer retention. 
 Chapter I fits most directly into the vast literature that exists regarding irrigation 
efficiency.  This is because improving efficiency is the primary causal mechanism by which 
most market-based policies seek to influence improved outcomes.  Given the technologies 
compared in this empirical analysis, I rely on basic research programs about variable-rate 
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irrigation (VRI) highlighted, for example, by Hedley (e.g., Hedley and Yule, 2009a; Hedley et 
al., 2009; Hedley et al., 2010a; Hedley et al., 2010b; Hedley et al., 2013) and Evett (e.g., Peters 
and Evett, 2008; Evett et al., 2014).  A range of empirical studies were necessary in order to 
populate parameters for dynamic hydrologic modeling.  Chapter I also relates closely to studies 
employing the same dynamic optimization model toward other groundwater management 
questions.  Kovacs et al. (2015) looked closely at the groundwater savings potential of on-farm 
reservoirs and found significant modeling differences when using a spatial-dynamic aquifer 
compared to a single-cell, ‘bathtub,’ aquifer.  Kovacs et al. (2014) used the same dynamic model 
to demonstrate how on-farm reservoirs can jointly manage groundwater retention and surface 
water quality outcomes.  Kovacs et al. (2016) and Kovacs and West (2016) examined tradeoffs 
between market benefits and ecosystem services.  Kovacs et al. (2017) used efficiency frontiers 
to evaluate optimal landcover and irrigation practices.  Chapter I continues this line of research 
inquiries. 
 The objectives that undergird Chapter II are to elicit public WTP for long-term 
groundwater management alternatives in the MRVA and for market and non-market 
groundwater services over time, and to endogenously estimate time preferences for groundwater 
benefits and costs.  A corollary objective is to estimate individual-level heterogeneity in WTP 
and time preferences using random parameters with flexible mixing distributions.  Train (2016) 
recently developed the Logit mixed logit (LML) model that allows for increased flexibility in the 
specification of random parameter distributions by incorporating a second logit term in the 
random utility model (RUM) that estimates a probability density function for individual 
parameter values.  I integrate time discounting into a discounted Logit mixed logit (D-LML) 
model and leverage this flexibility in the estimation of endogenous individual time preferences to 
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revisit Meyer’s (2013a) and Lew’s (2018) comparisons of alternative discounting forms using 
CE data.  Improved fit and new interpretations using flexible mixing distributions make this 
study a valuable contribution to the literature on time preferences for environmental goods and 
policies.  This contribution is above and beyond that provided by empirical estimates of public 
WTP for comprehensive groundwater services and alternative management policies, including a 
cap and trade groundwater permits marketplace. 
 Chapter III aims to test for the presence of systematic framing effects with respect to 
groundwater management policy preferences in response to a culturally-biased narrative about 
climate change.  I use a structuralist narrative frame imbued with generalizable meaning using 
Cultural Theory (CT) (e.g., Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Thompson et al., 1990).  Previous 
research by Jones and Song (2014) showed that narrative frames influence the way individuals 
organize information about climate change and policies to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions.  However, few if any studies about climate change perception acknowledge the 
distinction between policies that target controversial causes of climate change and other policies 
that mitigate long-term consequences.  The distinction is important to public policy as 
governments respond to climate change.  I contribute to the literature by conducting a CE to 
estimate public preferences for long-term groundwater management policies and the 
groundwater services under threat from climate change.   
Few studies measure policy preferences in response to generalizable narrative form and 
content.  Jones and Song (2014) used a structuralist narrative frame but did not measure policy 
preferences.  Berinsky and Kinder (2006) measured policy preferences relating to the 1990’s 
Kosovo intervention, but they did not employ a structuralist narrative from which meaningful 
systematic inference could be derived.  Zanocco et al. (2018) used a structuralist narrative to 
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measure cultural influences related to hydraulic fracturing preferences but does not use a choice 
context that compares to voting where individuals must make choices among limited options that 
involve important tradeoffs.  McMorris et al. (2018) measured hydraulic fracturing preferences 
and narrative responses employing survey measures modeled in the choice context of a vote.  
Using a CE to measure policy preferences and narrative influence, Chapter III contributes to this 
line of literature because CE data provide direct evidence about heterogeneity in preferences 
related to the different attributes of a policy alternative while forcing respondents to make 
choices involving important tradeoffs between those attributes.  I estimate mixed logit models 
with interaction terms for treatment effects to look for evidence of cultural cognition and test for 
systematic congruence and incongruence with the cultural frame. 
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I. Addressing Groundwater Declines with Precision Agriculture: An Economic 
Comparison of Monitoring Methods for Variable Rate Irrigation 
Co-author: Kent Kovacs 
More than 80 percent of the consumptive water use in the United States, which is the 
water lost to the environment, goes to irrigated agriculture (Schaible and Aillery, 2012). The 
Mississippi River Valley alluvial aquifer of the Delta is used by agriculture in Arkansas, 
Missouri, Mississippi, and Louisiana, and irrigated acreage has more than doubled from 1982 to 
2007 (Schaible and Aillery, 2012). Critical groundwater areas in the Delta region of eastern 
Arkansas continue to experience decline as groundwater demand outpaces recharge. Demand for 
groundwater constitutes 81% of the total water demand in the East Arkansas Region (Figure 1), 
and a groundwater gap of over seven million acre-feet is projected for 2050 (ANRC, 2014). A 
declining aquifer raises the cost of pumping groundwater and risks the future profitability of 
agriculture, the dominant industry in the region. These risks are amplified by prospects of long-
term drought and climate uncertainty. Additional benefits to society of a greater aquifer volume 
include the avoidance of subsidence, less seepage of surface water from riparian areas vital to 
wildlife, and less pumping of underlying aquifers used for drinking water in towns. There is a 
need to move toward sustainable levels of groundwater withdrawal. 
Precision agriculture provides the potential to enhance irrigation efficiency through site-
specific variable-rate irrigation management of crops. Irrigation efficiency is defined as the ratio 
of applied water that is beneficially used for crop growth to the total amount of applied water 
(Canessa et al., 2011). The irrecoverable fraction of applied water includes runoff from a 
geographic area, evaporation, and plant evapotranspiration (Canessa et al., 2011; Allen et al., 
2003). Some fraction of applied irrigation water is recoverable, re-entering the aquifer in the 
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future as deep percolation (Canessa et al., 2011; Allen et al., 2003). Field-level spatial variability 
in soil characteristics results in spatial variability of irrigation efficiency and can lead to over- or 
under- application of water under uniform application conditions. In most cases, a farmer will 
tend to over-apply to account for uneven distribution of water in the field and maximize yield 
(Snyder et al., 1986). Mapping the variability of appropriate field conditions using remote 
monitoring methods can allow a farmer to apply variable-rate irrigation management and 
maintain yields while decreasing water use and groundwater pumping (Hedley and Yule, 2009a; 
Hedley et al., 2009; Hedley et al., 2010a; Hedley et al., 2010b). 
Precision agriculture adoption is one means by which farmers can limit the over-
application of crop production inputs such as irrigation water and nutrients by using technology 
to inform site-specific management according to spatially localized conditions (Hedley et al., 
2010a; Thrikawala et al., 1999; Zhang et al., 2013). The spatial information technologies that 
have enabled precision agriculture include global positioning systems, geographic information 
systems, remote sensing, and variable-rate application technologies (Lowenber-DeBoer, 1999). 
Precision agriculture involves combining the functions of these technologies to help with 
decision-making about crop and soil management in specific field locations (Strickland et al., 
1998). 
For the purposes of managing variable irrigation rates, two different paradigms of 
monitoring field-level spatial variability have emerged and proved effective: one based on 
monitoring soil properties and the other on monitoring plant conditions (Hedley and Yule, 
2009a; Peters and Evett, 2008; LaRue, 2011). Hedley and Yule (2009a) demonstrated the 
potential to reduce irrigation water use by using soil–water balance to inform variable-rate 
irrigation of pre-mapped management zones at two sites in New Zealand. Stone et al. (Stone et 
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al., 2015) demonstrated the potential of similar methods in the humid Eastern U.S. Soil-based 
methods are thought to be superior because they more directly measure water-related stress as a 
function of plant available water content, whereas it can be more difficult with plant-based 
methods to separate the effect of the soil moisture property from that of other possible stresses 
such as nutrient deficiency (Barnes et al., 2003; O’Shaughnessy et al., 2015). Soil water 
measurements using soil moisture sensors, however, are only accurate for a small area, and soil 
water content is highly variable spatially and temporally (Longchamps et al., 2015). There is 
evidence that relative spatial variability of soil water content is persistent over time, further 
indicating the feasibility of variable-rate irrigation based on management zones (Starr, 2005; 
Hedley and Yule, 2009b). 
Networks of remote soil moisture sensors have shown the ability to effectively inform 
variable-rate irrigation and contribute to improvements in irrigation efficiency (Hedley and Yule, 
2009a; Hedley et al., 2010a; Zhang et al., 2013; LaRue, 2011; O’Shaughnessy et al., 2015). 
Though the soil moisture sensors themselves perform in-situ measurement of soil properties, 
these networks of sensors are monitored wirelessly by either an automated system or a user 
physically removed from the measurement site. In the past, installation of enough soil moisture 
sensors to capture soil variability has proven costly for farmers and has limited technology 
adoption (Schmitz and Kuyper, 1998; Schmitz and Sourell, 2000). This technology is getting 
better and more affordable at the same time that unmanned aerial vehicles are also becoming 
more economical for the purposes of plant-based remote sensing. Unmanned aircraft can deliver 
a variety of sensing devices including visual, multispectral, and thermal to monitor different 
aspects of plant health. There is even potential in the future for these vehicles to serve as the 
medium by which important production inputs such as seed, fertilizer, and chemical are applied 
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(Stombaugh et al., 2015). Though unmanned aerial vehicles have not been commonly used in 
agriculture to this point, the Department of Transit and Federal Aviation Administration have 
recently enacted a clear regulatory framework for small unmanned aerial aircraft, and many 
expect this to spur more widespread adoption in commercial uses such as agriculture (FAA, 
2016; Moffet, 2014). 
We compare the two remote monitoring methods, soil moisture sensors and unmanned 
aerial vehicles, for cost-effectiveness and net return per acre-foot of aquifer retention by 
modeling crop production and groundwater use across a spatially explicit farm landscape in the 
Delta region of eastern Arkansas. The model evaluates the optimal crop mix and irrigation 
practices to maximize farm returns across the gridded farm landscape. Spatial variation in crop 
yields, aquifer thickness, and the costs of groundwater pumping all influence the spatial-dynamic 
path of optimal management (Kovacs et al., 2015). The effectiveness of the remote monitoring 
methods for enhancing profitability and decreased pumping depends on these spatial variations. 
The area for the application of our model encompasses three eight-digit hydrologic unit 
code (HUC) watersheds overlying the Mississippi River Valley alluvial aquifer where 
groundwater levels are critical (Figure 1). Eight-digit HUCs define the drainage area of a sub-
basin of a river (Seaber et al., 1987). In addition to remote monitoring and variable-rate 
irrigation, we allow for the construction of on-farm reservoirs and tail-water recovery systems to 
help reduce pumping costs and promote recharge of the underlying aquifer. The impacts of 
remote monitoring and variable-rate irrigation are evaluated with and without the presence of 
reservoirs on the landscape. There are also ranges of potential costs and irrigation efficiencies 
associated with these remote monitoring methods, and the implications of these for investment in 
the technologies is considered. In addition, the effectiveness of policies that encourage the 
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adoption of the remote monitoring for improved water management and aquifer retention is 
compared to typical fee and quantity policies for conservation. We describe the model for the 
dynamics of land cover, water use, and profit maximization in Section 2 (Materials and 
Methods). Also in Section 2, we present data for crop land and model parameters and discuss 
sensitivity analyses. Section 3 discusses results, and we conclude with a discussion of major 
findings and future research needs. 
 
Figure 1. Three eight-digit hydrologic unit code (HUC) watersheds in the Mississippi 
Delta region of eastern Arkansas define the outer boundary of the study area. An eight-
digit HUC defines the drainage area of the sub-basin of a river. County lines overlay the 
study area. Public land and urban areas are excluded. The location of the study area within 
the state of Arkansas is shown. 
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Materials and Methods 
 Methods 
 We consider how crop patterns and irrigation use change as a farm collective maximizes 
profits on the landscape over time.  The model is then used to evaluate which approach to 
precision irrigation is more cost-effective for reducing groundwater pumping or delivers higher 
net return per acre-foot of aquifer retention. 
 Landcover 
 The land cover of the farm landscape includes crops, reservoirs, and conserved land set 
aside through a rental program of the government. The chosen crops generate economic returns, 
and irrigation depletes groundwater. The landscape is spatially heterogeneous due to differences 
in long-term investment in farm practices, soil types, and access to water resources (Division of 
Agriculture-University of Arkansas, 2012; Clark et al., 2013; ANRC, 2012). A time horizon T is 
chosen for a single generation of farmers to observe how depletion of the aquifer influences 
production decision, and a grid of m cells (sites) represents spatial differences. 
Major crops on the landscape include rice, irrigated soybean, corn, and cotton, non-
irrigated sorghum and soybean, and double-cropped irrigated soybean with winter wheat. The 
model tracks acreage across n number of land cover types j, including each of the crops, 
reservoirs that have tail-water recovery, and the US Department of Agriculture’s Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP). Lijt denotes the amount of land (acres) at site i in land cover type j at the 
end of period t. At the end of each period t, which is a 10-year interval, we assume any other 
land cover j can become on-farm reservoirs and tail-water recovery or CRP. A 10-year interval is 
appropriate because we expect crop rotations to emphasize more profitable crops over a decade, 
and this is a typical contract period for CRP land. A profit-maximizing farmer may switch land 
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out of irrigated crops into non-irrigated crops with declining groundwater availability at the end 
of each period. 
The initial land availability equals the sum of the land covers chosen for site i at any time 
t (Equation 1). 
    for   = crops, CRP, on-farm reservoirsn nijt ij0j j , jL L=∑ ∑  (1) 
 Irrigation 
 The average annual irrigation that crop j receives to supplement precipitation, wdj, is the 
demand for irrigation in acre-feet. The groundwater stored in the aquifer beneath site i at the end 
of the period t is AQit. The water that comes from the on-farm reservoirs is RWit, and the water 
from well pumping is GWit. There is recharge of the groundwater, nri, that occurs naturally from 
precipitation, streams, and underlying aquifers each period. 
Equation (2) shows the acre-feet of water stored in an acre reservoir as 
( ) maxmax min
0
,iRtn
ijj
L
L
+ −
∑
ωω ω  (2) 
which includes iRtL  as the acres in reservoirs at time t, and the total acreage at site i, 0
n
ijj
L∑ . If 
the reservoir occupies the entire site i and only the rainfall fills the reservoir, then the low-end 
acre-feet of water that fills each acre of reservoir is minω . If the reservoir is small compared to the 
entire site, then max
0
iRtn
ijj
L
L
ω
∑
 is close to zero, and the recovery of the runoff and rainfall fills the 
reservoir to near capacity in acre-feet per reservoir acre of ( )max minω ω+ . This does not account 
for temporal variability in the evaporation, leakage, and the timing of rainfall within each period, 
which could influence the values of maxω  and minω  for the reservoir. 
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The intensity of well pumping across the landscape influences aquifer depletion 
variability over space. The proportion of the underground flow into the aquifer at site k and out 
of site i when an acre-foot is pumped from a well at site k is pik, which depends on the distance 
and the lateral speed of underground water movement based on the soil profiles observed 
between sites (Kovacs et al., 2015). This means the groundwater that leaves site i is m ik ktk p GW∑
. We assume pumps have the same efficiency and power units to deliver a fixed amount of water 
per minute. 
The water used for irrigation must be less than the water available from reservoirs and 
wells (Equation (3)), and Equation (4) indicates the water stored in the reservoirs must be greater 
than the water used from the reservoirs. The aquifer volume in the previous period less the 
spatially weighted proportion of water pumped from the surrounding sites plus natural recharge 
equals the current aquifer volume (Equation (5)). The cost of pumping groundwater at a site, 
GCit, depends on the cost to lift an acre-foot of water by one foot, cp, and the initial depth to the 
groundwater, dpi. The depletion of the aquifer volume, ( )0i itAQ AQ− , divided by the area of the 
site, 0
n
ijj
L∑ , shows how much the depth to the aquifer increases. Capital costs per acre-foot for 
the well, which accounts for new well drilling in response to aquifer decline, is cc (Equation (6)).  
1
n
j ijt it itj
wd L GW RW
=
≤ +∑  (3) 
( ) maxmax min
0
it iRt iRtn
ijj
RW L L
L
ωω ω
 
 ≤ + −
 
 ∑  
(4) 
( 1)
m
it i t ik kt ik
AQ AQ p GW nr−= − +∑  (5) 
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( )0
0
i itc p
it i n
ijj
AQ AQ
GC c c dp
L
 − = + +
 
 ∑  
(6) 
 Profit objective 
 The cost to produce an acre of the crop, excluding the irrigation costs caj and the price 
per conventional unit of the crop, is prj and constant in real terms. We assume no productivity 
growth trend for the constant yield of crop j per acre at site i, yij. Excluding the costs of 
irrigation, the net value for crop j is then prjyij − caj per acre. The CRP payment per acre to the 
landowner, prcrpyicrp, with yield normalized to one and price is the payment per acre, less the cost 
to establish and maintain an acre of CRP (cacrp) is the net value per acre of CRP. The reservoir 
pumping cost per acre-foot is crw, and the per acre capital and maintenance cost of a reservoir 
each period is cr. We make values over time comparable in monetary terms using the real 
discount factor, tδ . 
Equation (7) indicates the economic objective to maximize the present value of farm 
profits over the fixed horizon T by changing the amount of land in each crop or CRP, the 
reservoir water use, and groundwater use, namely Lijt, RWit, and GWit. The fixed horizon T is a 
30 years in length, and each period is ten years in length. The non-negativity constraints on land, 
water use, and the aquifer are shown in Equation (8). 
( )
, , 1 1 1
max :
ijt it it
T m n
r rw
t j ij j ijt iRt it it itL RW GW t i j
pr y ca L c L c RW GC GWδ
= = =
 
− − − − 
 
∑ ∑∑
 
(7) 
subject to: 
0, 0, 0, 0ijt it it itL RW GW AQ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥  (8) 
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and the spatial dynamics of land and irrigation (Equations (1)–(6)). We use the non-linear 
programming solver CONOPT from AKRI Consulting and Development to perform the 
optimization in the Generalized Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS, 2010). 
 Cost-effectiveness and net returns per acre-foot of aquifer retention 
 The cost-effectiveness of aquifer retention using precision irrigation is calculated by first 
finding the difference in the present value of costs and the difference in the final aquifer volume 
between the baseline and a model with only the soil moisture sensors or only the unmanned 
aerial vehicles. The baseline model supposes no adoption of soil moisture sensors or unmanned 
aerial vehicles, and this is compared to models with only soil moisture sensors or only unmanned 
aerial vehicles. The division of the difference in the present value of costs by the difference in 
the final aquifer volume indicates the cost effectiveness of a particular precision irrigation 
technique. The net returns per acre-foot of aquifer retention come from the division of the 
difference in the present value of net returns by the difference in the final aquifer volume. 
 Sensitivity analyses and conservation policies 
 The baseline, soil moisture sensors only, and unmanned aerial vehicle only models are 
then run again with on-farm reservoirs on the landscape to see how this changes crop choice, 
cost-effectiveness, and net-benefit assessments. Another sensitivity analysis considers low- and 
high-range costs and water-use efficiencies for each of the crops using either the soil moisture 
sensors or the unmanned aerial vehicles. 
Policy options for groundwater conservation include cost-share for the precision 
irrigation techniques of soil moisture sensors and unmanned aerial vehicles by modifying cajk. 
Scenarios regulating groundwater pumping levels and taxing groundwater pumping cost GC are 
also compared. The cost share is 60% for soil moisture sensors and unmanned aerial vehicles 
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based on the rates from similar improvements under the Natural Resource Conservation 
Service’s (NRCS) Agricultural Water Enhancement Program (NRCS, 2014). We chose a 
regulation on groundwater pumping to 220% of initial levels and a fee on groundwater pumping 
costs of 4% to achieve groundwater conservation similar to the cost share on reservoir 
construction. Farm net returns in policy scenarios include the payments to or receipts from the 
government because of the policy. Groundwater conservation cost is calculated as the policy cost 
(baseline farm net returns less the farm net returns plus government revenue) divided by the 
change in aquifer level between the policy option and the baseline. All policy scenarios allow for 
construction of on-farm reservoirs. 
 Data 
 The outer boundary of the study area consists of three eight-digit HUC watersheds in the 
Arkansas Delta region with critical groundwater areas and non-point source pollution priorities 
(Figure 1). These watersheds overlap eleven Arkansas counties, and the average for the past 5 
years of crop yields by county is a proxy for the yield of the crops (Division of Agriculture- 
University of Arkansas, 2012). We evaluate crop mix and irrigation methods on a landscape with 
spatial heterogeneity by dividing the study area into 2724 sites of approximately 600 acres each. 
At this size, sites approximate farm scale and realistically capture the dynamics of the aquifer in 
response to pumping across the landscape. Sites having entirely non-cropland uses in the 2013 
Cropland Data Layer (CDL), e.g., public lands, water, and urban areas, are removed (Johnson 
and Mueller, 2010). The initial acreage of rice, corn, cotton, soybeans, and sorghum comes from 
the 2013 CDL, and on the basis of harvested acreage for 2010–2011 the soybean acreage is split 
into non-irrigated soybean, irrigated soybean, and double crop soybeans (Table 1) (USDA-
NASS, 2012). In addition, to account for the time-value of money in the optimization of returns 
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over the 30-year period, the yield of the 30-year Treasury Bond over the last decade suggests and 
we employ a real discount rate of 5% (US Treasury Department, 2012). Over the last 5 to 10 
years the real discount rate is close to 2%, but looking back over 30 years a 5% discount rate is a 
better approximation. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the model data across the sites of the study area. 
Variabl
e Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
Sum 
(Thousands) 
Li,rice Initial acres of rice 81 99 221 
Li,corn Initial acres of corn 52 77 143 
Li,cotton Initial acres of cotton 10 40 26 
Li,isoy Initial acres of irrigated soybean 165 97 449 
Li,dsoy Initial acres of dry land soybean 57 49 155 
Li,dsorg Initial acres of dry land sorghum 7 23 20 
Li,dbl Initial acres of double crop irrigated soybean and winter wheat 47 73 129 
yi,rice Annual rice yield (cwt per acre) 1 71 3 - 
yi,cotton Annual cotton yield (pounds per acre) 1 1012 148 - 
yi,corn Annual corn yield (bushels per acre) 1 166 11 - 
yi,isoy Annual irrigated soybean yield (bushels per acre) 1 42 4 - 
yi,dsoy Annual dry land soybean yield (bushels per acre) 1 25 3 - 
yi,dsorg Annual dry land sorghum yield (bushels per acre) 1 69 12 - 
yi,dbl Annual double crop irrigated soybean yield (bushels per acre) 1 34 1 - 
yi,wheat Annual winter wheat yields (bushels per acre) 1 57 5 - 
dpi Depth to water (feet) 57 31 - 
AQi Initial volume of the aquifer (acre-feet) 
28,04
7 11,972 76,398 
K Hydraulic conductivity (feet per day) 226 92 - 
nri Annual natural recharge of the aquifer per acre (acre-feet) 0.45 0.19 1.22 
Note: Number of sites is 2724; 1 The mean and the standard deviation of the county yields come 
from the 11 counties of the study area. 
  
 Aquifer 
 Table 1 shows the initial depth to the water table and volume of the Alluvial aquifer from 
the Arkansas Natural Resources Commission (ANRC, 2012). The acreage of the site times the 
saturated thickness of the aquifer is the volume of the aquifer at site i. The natural recharge, nri, 
of the Alluvial aquifer is based on a calibrated model of recharge for the period 1994 to 1998 
associated with precipitation, flow to or from streams, and other groundwater fluxes (Reed, 
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2003). It is important to note that improvements in irrigation efficiency resulting from the use of 
precision irrigation impact both recoverable and irrecoverable fractions of applied irrigation 
water. Some improvement comes in the form of decreased amounts of direct evaporation and 
runoff which directly contributes to groundwater conservation (Allen et al., 2003; Yohannes and 
Tadesse, 1998; Kebede et al., 2014). This is accompanied, however, by decreased amounts of the 
recoverable fraction of deep percolation. The proportions of improved irrigation efficiency 
attributable to recoverable and irrecoverable fractions are not precisely known. Furthermore, 
decision makers in many aquifer systems consider losses to deep percolation to be irrecoverable 
fractions due to the amount of time it takes for water to reach a reusable state (Canessa et al., 
2011; CALFED, 2006; Pfeiffer and Lin, 2014). With these facts in mind, we do not consider 
differences in the rate of recoverable deep percolation resulting from precision irrigation in our 
modeled calculations of aquifer levels. 
The spatial weight (pik) is the expected proportion of groundwater that flows underground 
out of site i into site k when an acre-foot of groundwater is pumped from site k, where pik is 
based on the distance between sites i and k, the saturated thickness, and hydraulic conductivity of 
the aquifer (Kovacs et al., 2015). These dynamics dictate how well pumping reduces the aquifer 
beneath the surrounding cells. The aquifer below the well and the aquifer of the surrounding sites 
declines in response to well pumping. Water flows from the aquifer of surrounding sites into the 
site with the cone of depression created by the pumped well. The distance from the pumped site 
and the hydraulic conductivity of the aquifer, as described above, influence the volume of the 
underground flow from the surrounding sites. Clark et al. (2013) use spatially coarse pilot points 
to digitize the hydraulic conductivity of the aquifer measured by feet per day. The spatial weight 
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depends on the volume of underground flow, and this determines how much an acre-foot of 
water pumped from a well reduces the aquifer beneath the surrounding sites. 
 Farm production and the on-farm reservoir and tail-water recovery system 
 The costs of production by crop from the 2014 Crop Cost of Production estimates, 
excluding irrigation, are shown in Table 2 (Flanders et al., 2014). The crop specific irrigation 
water use comes from the Division of Agriculture (Division of Agriculture-University of 
Arkansas, 2012). The 5-year average of December futures prices for harvest time contracts for all 
crops are used for the crop prices (GPTC, 2012). The sign-ups in Arkansas as of March 2015 
indicate the CRP payment per acre (USDA-FSA, 2015). 
Table 2. Value of economic and irrigation model parameters. 
Parameter Definition Value 
prrice Price of rice ($/cwt) 14.00 
prcot Price of cotton ($/lbs) 0.88 
prcorn Price of corn ($/bushel) 5.50 
prsoy Price of soybeans ($/bushel) 11.99 
prsorg Price of sorghum ($/bushel) 5.23 
prwht Price of wheat ($/bushel) 6.39 
carice Annual production cost of rice ($/acre) 646 
cacorn Annual production cost of corn ($/acre) 632 
cacotton Annual production cost of cotton ($/acre) 742 
caisoy Annual production cost of irrigated soybean ($/acre) 349 
cadsoy Annual production cost of dry land soybean ($/acre) 289 
cadsorg Annual production cost of dry land sorghum ($/acre) 270 
cadbl Annual production cost of double crop irrigated soybean and winter wheat ($/acre) 656 
wdrice Annual irrigation per acre of rice (acre-feet) 2.5 
wdcorn Annual irrigation per acre of corn (acre-feet) 1.0 
wdcotton Annual irrigation per acre of cotton (acre-feet) 1.0 
wdisoy Annual irrigation per acre of full-season soybean (acre-feet) 1.0 
wddbl Annual irrigation per acre of double crop soybean (acre-feet) 0.75 
ωmin Low-end annual capacity per acre of reservoir (acre-feet) 4.0 
ωbase Baseline annual capacity per acre of reservoir (acre-feet) 7.5 
ωmax High-end annual capacity per acre of reservoir (acre-feet) 11.0 
c’min Low-end annual per acre cost of reservoir ($/acre) a 285 
c’base Baseline annual per acre cost of reservoir ($/acre) a 377 
c’max High-end annual per acre cost of reservoir ($/acre) a 777 
rwc  Cost to re-lift an acre-foot to and from the reservoir ($/acre-foot) 22.62 
cp Cost to raise an acre-foot of water by one foot ($/foot) 0.55 
tδ  Discount factor 0.98 
Note: a this is the annual amortized construction cost and maintenance cost for each acre of 
reservoir. 
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Variable irrigation costs from wells or reservoirs include fuel, lube and oil, irrigation 
labor, and poly pipe for furrow irrigation plus the levee gates for the flood irrigation of rice 
(Hogan et al., 2010). The fuel cost per acre-foot of groundwater depends on the fuel needed to 
raise water from the aquifer, which depends on the depth to the aquifer and the efficiency of the 
pump, gear-head, and motor. The groundwater pump is assumed to deliver 1800 gallons per 
minute and the stationary re-lift pump for the reservoir and tail-water recovery system to deliver 
2000 gallons per minute (Hogan et al., 2010). The range in diesel use for a well is 13 gallons of 
diesel per acre-foot for a 100 foot well to 26 gallons of diesel per acre-foot for a 200-foot well, 
and 6 gallons of diesel is needed per acre-foot for pumping water to and from the reservoir 
(Division of Agriculture-University of Arkansas, 2012). To account for the oil and lube for 
irrigation equipment, we add 10% to the fuel cost of $3.77 per gallon of diesel fuel (EIA, 2012). 
To calculate a capital cost per acre-foot pumped, the capital cost of the irrigation equipment is 
amortized, and this is divided by the acre-feet pumped from the well (Hogan et al., 2010). These 
technologies and costs characterize the conventional irrigation methods of our baseline scenario. 
On-farm reservoir/tail-water recovery construction and maintenance costs for various 
reservoir sizes were estimated using Modified Arkansas Off-Stream Reservoir Analysis 
(MARORA) to obtain capital cost estimates (Smartt et al., 2002). Since a majority of the 
construction cost for a reservoir rests on the cost to move one cubic yard of soil, this cost was 
updated from $1 per cubic yard to $1.2 per cubic yard to reflect changes in fuel cost. The 
remainder of the investment and maintenance cost comes from MARORA estimates and includes 
re-lift pumps for moving water from the tail-water pit to the reservoir and from the reservoir to 
the field. The reservoir and tail-water recovery system capital cost is amortized to annual per 
acre payments. The minimum volume of water (ωmin) an acre reservoir will hold comes from the 
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tail-water recovery system collecting rainfall alone to fill a reservoir by 1.4 acre-feet of water 
(Young et al., 2004). The maximum capacity accounting for evaporation of 11 acre-feet per acre 
is based on irrigation runoff supplementing the rainfall runoff (Smartt et al., 2002). 
 Production cost and water use factors for remote monitoring technologies 
 Model scenarios involving precision irrigation technologies require adjustment factors for 
production cost and water use. Table 3 reports these factors by crop type. In addition to a 
baseline scenario, adjustment factors are provided for sensitivity analyses involving low and high 
cost and water use scenarios. Water use improvements resulting from soil moisture sensor-
informed variable-rate irrigation were taken from LaRue (2011), who conducted field 
experiments to determine the benefits of variable-rate irrigation relative to applying uniform 
irrigation amounts. Hedley et al. (2009) and Hedley et al. (2010b) also observed comparable 
water savings over several years using similar methods. The adjustment factor for water use in 
the baseline scenario draws from these experimental results, while the high and low adjustment 
factors used for sensitivity analysis come from discussion in Hedley et al. (2013). The soil 
moisture sensor network and variable-rate system used in the field experiments were similar to 
Vories et al. (2008), and costs associated with these methods were gathered from several sources 
and used to calculate additional per-acre production costs associated with the soil moisture 
sensors. Production cost adjustment factors were calculated separately for each of the crop types. 
Soil mapping is necessary for delineating management zones, and services are available for 
approximately $4.00 per acre Camp et al., 2006; Meron et al., 2010; Evett et al., 2014; Olson, 
2000). An interval of five years is used for the re-delineation of management zones. The network 
of soil moisture sensors costs approximately $8,400 for a farm similar in size to a single grid cell 
(600 acres) in our modeled study area, while a digital data logger costs approximately $1300, 
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and both may need replacing approximately every five years (Vellidis et al., 2008). Costs for a 
retrofitted variable-rate irrigation system approximate $50,000 for a farm of grid cell size, and it 
is assumed to last the entire thirty years of the study period (USDA-NRCS, 2016). Capital costs 
were amortized and all additional production costs calculated on an annual per-acre basis in 
present value terms, allowing for easy calculation of adjustment factors for production costs. 
The same retrofitted variable-rate system is used with the scenario of precision irrigation 
informed by unmanned aerial vehicles monitoring plant conditions. The application of unmanned 
aerial vehicles for precision management through mapping crop water stress has been 
demonstrated (Herwitz et al., 2004; Berni et al., 2009a; Berni et al., 2009b; Xiang and Tian, 
2011; Shi et al., 2016). Because unmanned aerial vehicles can monitor plant conditions with a 
high degree of spatial resolution—as opposed to the limited point measurements of soil moisture 
sensors—soil mapping is not a necessary cost associated with this practice. The use of unmanned 
vehicles for mapping water stress depends on unmanned fixed-wing aircraft equipped with GPS, 
autopilot, and appropriate sensing devices. The platform used in modeling this scenario is 
described in Ireland-Otto et al. (Ireland-Otto et al., 2016). It is a X-8 fixed-wing craft with a 
ground control station and launcher ($12,000). A thermal infrared sensor ($3500) mounted under 
the aircraft is necessary to monitor water stress. Aircraft and sensor replacement are assumed at 
ten years. Some data processing is required to apply monitoring data to variable-rate irrigation, at 
an annual cost of $0.20 per acre. Automated closed-loop programs that include data processing 
are likely to emerge in the near future, so costs are likely to change. Peters and Evett (2008) 
demonstrated the automation of variable-rate irrigation using the Temperature-Time-Threshold 
(TTT) method of plant monitoring to determine water stress and compared results with those of 
soil moisture sensor monitoring methods. The TTT method was not quite as water efficient as the 
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soil moisture sensing method. Based on the relative water-use efficiencies for increasing yield 
observed by Peters and Evett (2008) (TTT = 0.909 kg dry biomass/m3 irrigation water, SMS = 
0.961 kg dry biomass/m3 irrigation water), a water-use adjustment factor for each crop was 
calculated for the precision irrigation scenario informed by unmanned aerial vehicle monitoring.   
Because production cost and water use adjustment factor parameters have been populated 
with data collected under different irrigation and cropping systems than we observe and model in 
the Arkansas Delta, sensitivity analyses considering low- and high-range costs and water-use 
efficiencies are particularly helpful to the cost-effectiveness comparison (Table 3). 
Table 3. Value of production cost and irrigation efficiency factors. 
Adjustment Factor Scenario Rice Corn Cotton Irrigated Soybean 
Double Crop 
Soybean 
Baseline 
Production cost ($/acre)  646 632 742 349 656 
Water use (acre-feet)  2.5 1 1 1 0.75 
Soil Moisture sensors 
Production cost factor a 
Low e 1.015 1.016 1.013 1.028 1.015 
Base 1.023 1.024 1.020 1.043 1.023 
High e 1.041 1.042 1.035 1.075 1.040 
Irrigation efficiency factor b 
Low f 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 
Base 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 
High f 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 
Unmanned aerial vehicles 
Production cost factor c 
Low e 1.014 1.014 1.012 1.025 1.013 
Base 1.022 1.022 1.019 1.040 1.021 
High e 1.039 1.040 1.034 1.073 1.039 
Irrigation efficiency factor d 
Low f 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 
Base 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 
High f 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Note: a (52–54); b (15); c (52,55); d (14); e (63,64); f (49). 
Results 
 Table 4 indicates the results of the baseline model without precision irrigation or 
reservoirs. The relative prices over the last 5 years make rice and corn the predominant crops on 
the landscape at the end of the study period (Figure 2a), and both are irrigation intensive crops. 
This makes the aquifer decline from 76 million acre-feet to 48.2 million acre-feet in 2045, and 
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the 30-year farm net returns are $5.22 billion. We compare these results with a landscape where 
farms adopt soil moisture sensors or unmanned aerial vehicles to reduce the costly application of 
irrigation water. The use of soil moisture sensors increases the amount of land in rice from 305 
thousand acres to 343 thousand acres, and most of the rice acreage adopts soil moisture sensors 
to mitigate irrigation costs (Figure 2b). The increase in rice acreage is accompanied by a decline 
in corn, cotton, soybean, and non-irrigated sorghum acres. Although rice acreage expands, the 
soil moisture sensors mean less well pumping, and the aquifer in the final period is close to 48.7 
million acre-feet. Figure 2d,e depicts the extent of precision irrigation adoption under each 
scenario. 
The use of unmanned aerial vehicles increases rice acreage to only 316 thousand acres 
because of the lower irrigation efficiency compared to soil moisture sensors, and much of the 
rice remains in conventional irrigation. There is a slight decline in the acres of corn, cotton, 
double crop soybean, and non-irrigated sorghum compared to the baseline (Figure 2c). The final 
aquifer volume is 48.6 million acre-feet, slightly lower than the 48.7 million acre-feet with the 
soil moisture sensors, but higher than the 48.2 million acre-feet baseline. The soil moisture 
sensors have greater net returns per acre-foot conserved than the unmanned aerial vehicles, $9.09 
per acre-foot versus $7.69 per acre-foot, because high-value rice acreage increases more with the 
soil sensors. The soil moisture sensor technology is more expensive per acre, though, and this 
makes it a less cost-effective solution for aquifer retention than the unmanned aerial vehicles. 
The positive net returns indicate that both farmers and conservationists gain from the 
technologies. Though the utility of unmanned aerial vehicles for precision management through 
mapping crop water stress has been demonstrated (Herwitz et al., 2004; Berni et al., 2009a; Berni 
et al., 2009b; Xiang and Tian, 2011; Shi et al., 2016), and plant-based monitoring of water stress 
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to automate variable-rate irrigation has shown the ability to improve irrigation water use (Peters 
and Evett, 2008), systematic and multidisciplinary research is still necessary to verify and 
quantify improvements from managing crop inputs based on images from unmanned aerial 
vehicles (Shi et al., 2016; Zhang and Kovacs, 2012). 
Table 4. Influence of precision irrigation on land and water use in 2045, and 30-year economic 
returns without and with on-farm reservoirs. 
 
Land, Water, and Economic Conditions 
No Reservoirs Reservoirs 
No SMS 
and No 
UAV 
SMS UAV 
No SMS 
and No 
UAV 
SMS UAV 
Land use (1000 acres) 
Rice—conventional irrigation 305 110 187 351 103 230 
Rice—PI - 233 129 - 287 127 
Irrigated soybeans—conventional irrigation 3 2 5 3 1 5 
Irrigated soybeans—PI - - - - - - 
Irrigated corn—conventional irrigation 620 349 356 684 390 394 
Irrigated corn—PI - 262 259 - 282 284 
Irrigated cotton—conventional irrigation 63 47 53 63 48 55 
Irrigated cotton—PI - 8 7 - 7 7 
Double crop soybean/wheat—conventional 
irrigation 30 28 29 - - - 
Double crop soybean/wheat—PI - - - - - - 
Non-irrigated soybeans - - - - - - 
Non-irrigated sorghum 121 104 117 22 8 23 
Reservoirs - - - 18 16 17 
Water use (1000 ac-ft./year) 
Annual water use 1448 1422 1427 1628.7 1581.6 
1594.
3 
Annual reservoir water use - - - 202.7 180.6 193.3 
Annual groundwater use 1448 1422 1427 1426 1401 1401 
Aquifer 48,210 48,760 
48,60
0 50,150 
50,41
0 
50,28
0 
30 year farm net returns (million $) 5219 5224 5222 5481 5497 5485 
Cost effectiveness ($/ac-ft.) - 364 256 - 1538 769 
Net returns per ac-ft. ($/ac-ft.) - 9.09 7.69 - 62 31 
Note: SMS: Soil-moisture sensors; UAV: Unmanned aerial vehicles; PI: precision irrigation. 
 30 
 
Figure 2. Predominant crops grown on the landscape in: (a) the baseline (No SMS and no 
UAV); and with precision irrigation using (b) soil moisture sensors (SMS); or (c) unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAV). Non-irrigated crops and precision irrigated rice replace corn when remote 
sensing techniques are adopted. The percent of cropland using precision irrigation is shown when 
the remote sensing technique is: (d) soil moisture sensors; and (e) unmanned aerial vehicles. The 
percentage of precision irrigated cropland is higher in the northern and western sections of the 
landscape where the aquifer is more depleted. 
 
The presence of on-farm reservoirs and tail-water recovery increases the land in rice and 
corn compared to the baseline, and the non-irrigated sorghum is nearly gone. When the soil 
moisture sensors are adopted on the landscape rice increases to 390 thousand acres, corn falls to 
672 thousand acres, and the acres in both non-irrigated crop and in reservoirs falls. The aquifer 
level in the final period rises to 50.4 million acre-feet from 50.2 million acre-feet without the soil 
moisture sensors. If unmanned aerial vehicles are adopted on the landscape with reservoirs, then 
the rice acres rise slightly to 357 thousand acres, and the corn acres fall to 678 thousand acres. 
The acres in reservoirs and non-irrigated sorghum are virtually unchanged from the landscape 
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with reservoirs but without the unmanned aerial vehicles. The aquifer volume increased slightly 
over the baseline with 50.3 million acre-feet in the final period. 
The net returns per acre-foot are higher for the precision irrigation when reservoirs are 
used on the landscape. This is because more crops use irrigation when reservoirs provide surface 
water. The farm returns to irrigation that is more efficient and the aquifer retention are magnified 
by precision irrigation when more of the landscape is using irrigation than before. The net returns 
per acre are $62 per acre-foot for the soil moisture sensors and $31 per acre-foot for the 
unmanned aerial vehicles. Looking only at cost-effectiveness for an acre-foot of aquifer 
retention, though, the unmanned aerial vehicles are preferred since the technology is somewhat 
less expensive. 
The cost and irrigation efficiency of the soil moisture sensors and unmanned aerial 
vehicles is not known with certainty. We use a low and high-end range for the cost and irrigation 
efficiency of the precision irrigation technologies to see how crop choice, well pumping, and the 
farm net returns are affected in Table 5. For the soil moisture sensors, rice expands to 452 
thousand acres for the low cost/high irrigation efficiency scenario while the high cost/low 
irrigation efficiency scenario has rice expand to just 331 thousand acres. The large expansion of 
rice in the low cost/high irrigation efficiency scenario makes corn and other crop acreage fall 
compared to the baseline, and even though more irrigation intensive rice is grown, the well 
pumping falls to 1422 thousand acre-feet in the final period because the soil moisture sensors 
increase irrigation efficiency. The crop mix in the high cost/low irrigation efficiency scenario for 
the soil moisture sensors is largely the same as the landscape without the soil moisture sensors. 
The well pumping, though, does fall from the baseline to 1433 thousand acre-feet in the final 
period because of soil moisture sensor adoption. 
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Table 5. Sensitivity analysis of the costs and irrigation efficiency of precision irrigation on land 
and water use in 2045, and 30-year economic returns. 
 
Land, Water, and Economic Conditions 
No 
SMS 
and No 
UAV 
Low 
Cost/High 
IE SMS 
High 
Cost/Low 
IE SMS 
Low 
Cost/High 
IE UAV 
High 
Cost/Low 
IE UAV 
Land use (1000 acres) 
Rice—conventional irrigation 305 91 99 90 231 
Rice—PI - 361 232 340 73 
Irrigated soybeans—conventional irrigation 3 0 2 0 6 
Irrigated soybeans—PI - - - - - 
Irrigated corn—conventional irrigation 620 282 349 311 363 
Irrigated corn—PI - 254 265 242 255 
Irrigated cotton—conventional irrigation 63 34 48 39 56 
Irrigated cotton—PI - 18 9 12 7 
Double crop soybean/wheat—conventional 
 
30 23 29 25 30 
Double crop soybean/wheat—PI - - - - - 
Non-irrigated soybeans - - - - - 
Non-irrigated sorghum 121 79 108 81 121 
Reservoirs - - - - - 
Water use (1000 ac-ft./year) 
Annual groundwater use 1448 1295 1433 1338 1437 
Aquifer 48,210 50,240 48,560 49,770 48,390 
30 year farm net returns (million $) 5219 5402 5222 5328 5220 
Cost effectiveness ($/ac-ft.) - 148 486 110 365 
Net returns per ac-ft. ($/ac-ft.) - 90 8.57 70 5.55 
Note: SMS: Soil-moisture sensors; UAV: Unmanned aerial vehicles; PI: precision irrigation; IE: 
Irrigation efficiency. 
 
These crop and water use changes on the landscape from the soil moisture sensor use 
make the 30-year farm net returns edge up slightly with the high cost/low irrigation efficiency 
scenario and go up substantially to $5.40 billion in the low cost/high irrigation efficiency 
scenario. The aquifer rises to 50.2 million acre-feet in the low cost/high irrigation efficiency 
scenario and to just 48.6 million acre-feet in the high cost/low irrigation efficiency scenario. The 
net-benefit assessment indicates $90 per acre-foot if the soil moisture sensors are low cost and 
high efficiency, and a modest $8.57 per acre-foot for high cost and low efficiency sensors. This 
means there is a wide range of potential net returns to an optimized landscape allowing the use of 
soil moisture sensors, but implementation that more closely approximates the low cost/high 
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irrigation efficiency scenario can generate substantial gains to both farmers and the aquifer. The 
use of unmanned aerial vehicles makes the rice acreage expand to 430 thousand acres in the low 
cost/high irrigation efficiency scenario but fall slightly to 304 thousand acres in the high cost/low 
irrigation efficiency scenario. The low cost/high irrigation efficiency scenario for unmanned 
aerial vehicles has 1338 thousand acre-feet of well pumping in the final period because the 
unmanned aerial vehicles allow for a reduction in water use even as rice acres expand. There are 
1437 thousand acre-feet of well pumping in the final period for the high cost/low efficiency 
scenario, only slightly below the baseline, because there is limited adoption of the unmanned 
aerial vehicles when the irrigation efficiency is low. The aquifer rises to 49.7 million acre-feet 
and 30-year farm net returns rise to $5.3 billion in the low cost/high efficiency scenario; 
however, the aquifer rises to only 48.4 million acre-feet and $5.2 billion in 30-year farm net 
returns for the high cost/low irrigation efficiency scenario. The wide range in the net returns per 
acre-foot for the low and high-end scenarios, from $70 to $5.55 per acre-foot, for the unmanned 
aerial vehicles indicates, as for the soil sensors, that improving the efficiency of the technology is 
valuable for profitability and aquifer retention. 
The use of cost-share assistance to encourage precision irrigation, shown in Table 6, 
improves farm net returns over 30 years and increases the volume of the aquifer, but the subsidy 
represents a loss of government revenue that the taxpayer must bear. The policies result in a loss 
of economic value to society because the rise in farm net returns is less than the loss in 
government revenue. However, these polices allow more of the aquifer to be retained. The 
groundwater conservation cost per acre-foot for the study period is found by dividing the 
economic cost to society of the policy by the acre-feet of the aquifer conserved. The soil 
moisture sensors are more irrigation-efficient and only slightly more expensive than the 
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unmanned aerial vehicles, and this makes the $59 groundwater conservation cost per acre-foot 
for the cost-share on the soil moisture sensors less than the $67 cost per acre-foot for the 
unmanned aerial vehicles. The cost-share policies are both expensive, however, compared to the 
groundwater conservation cost associated with policies such as a cap on groundwater use 
($12/acre-foot) or a fee on groundwater use ($1.6 acre-foot). Policies that target groundwater use 
directly through a cap or tax appear more cost-effective at groundwater conservation than the 
policies that offer a cost-share on irrigation technology for crops such as cotton and soybeans 
that are not especially irrigation intensive. 
Table 6. Water conservation policies influence on aquifer, and economic returns, government 
revenue, and groundwater conservation cost 
 
Policy 
Aquifer, 
2045 
(Thousand 
Acre-Feet) 
Farm Net 
Returns, 30 Year 
NPV a ($ Millions) 
Government 
Revenue, 30 
Year NPV ($ 
Millions) 
Groundwater 
Conservation 
Cost b ($ Per 
Acre-Foot) 
Baseline 48,210 5219 - - 
Cost share on soil moisture sensors c 49,140 5231 −67 $59 
Cost share on unmanned aerial 
hi l   
48,540 5231 −34 $67 
Cap on groundwater use d 49,510 5204 - $12 
Fee on groundwater use d 49,430 5150 2 $1.6 
Note: All allow on-farm reservoirs. a The farm net returns include the payments to or receipts 
from the government because of the policy; b Groundwater conservation cost is calculated as the 
policy cost (which is the farm net returns in the baseline less the farm net returns plus 
government revenue for each policy scenario) divided by the change in aquifer level between the 
policy option and the baseline; c The cost share is 60% for soil moisture sensors and unmanned 
aerial vehicles based on the rates from the Natural Resource Conservation Service’s (NRCS) 
Agricultural Water Enhancement Program (33); d We choose a cap on groundwater pumping 
(220% of initial pumping levels) and a fee on groundwater pumping costs (4%) to achieve 
groundwater conservation similar to the cost share on soil moisture sensors. 
 
Discussion 
 Our results support the conclusion that remote monitoring to inform variable-rate 
irrigation practices is an increasingly viable alternative for reducing groundwater depletion 
through precision agriculture. We demonstrate that remote monitoring to inform variable-rate 
irrigation can improve irrigation efficiency modestly enough to conserve aquifer volumes, reduce 
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pumping costs, and increase net returns by still allowing for more production of profitable but 
water-intensive rice. Furthermore, our results indicate the potential of remote monitoring and 
variable-rate irrigation to provide benefits in tandem with other complimentary practices such as 
the use of the on-farm reservoirs. 
The uncertainty around the cost and water-use efficiency of the remote sensing 
techniques suggest that the net-returns per acre-foot of aquifer retention could be significantly 
larger or a little lower than the baseline costs and water use efficiencies for the precision 
irrigation techniques suggest. As the costs of the sensors fall and the efficiencies continue to 
improve, then the net returns per acre-foot of conserved aquifer promise to become substantially 
larger. As an important reminder, our model makes the simplifying assumption that all reduction 
in applied water due to improved irrigation efficiency saves irrecoverable fractions of applied 
irrigation water. While the overwhelming proportion of annual recharge to the alluvial aquifer is 
the result of precipitation and surface water flux (Reed, 2003), precision irrigation scenarios may 
overestimate the aquifer volume by failing to account for decreased levels of deep percolation 
over the long term. 
A cost-share policy to encourage more adoption of the sensing technologies appears to 
incur greater costs on society than either a regulatory cap of groundwater use or tax on 
groundwater use. Leaving aside issues surrounding an equitable share of the conservation burden 
across the agricultural producers and the rest of society, the most efficient approach to 
conservation is through directly targeting the overused resource with a cap or a tax. 
The evaluation of benefits and costs here between soil moisture sensors and unmanned 
aerial vehicles only considers increased performance in irrigation efficiency with respect to soil-
based versus plant-based monitoring regimes. We do not consider other benefits of variable-rate 
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irrigation or other applications of remote monitoring which might present other benefits. Another 
implication of targeted spatial application of irrigation is that nutrient and sediment runoff is 
minimized, improving the quality of surface waters (EPA, 2003). In addition, it may be possible 
to monitor a range of other plant conditions with unmanned aerial vehicles at little additional 
cost that are not able to be measured by wireless soil moisture sensors (Stombaugh et al., 2015). 
Explicit spatial management of other crop conditions might even allow farmers to realize more 
fully the benefits of high spatial resolution monitoring. For instance, producers may be able to 
improve the efficiency of nutrient application and uptake in a way that both lowers costs and 
increases yield. Although many farms may already have spatial soil information, we do not know 
how many have this information or how many use any form of precision agriculture. To be 
conservative in the adoption rates of this technology, we attribute all the costs of this spatial soil 
information to the soil sensors. To the extent most farmers already have this information, the soil 
moisture sensors will be more profitable than we have indicated. 
The soil sensor technologies resemble a constant return to scale technology more than 
other irrigation equipment like center pivots or on-farm reservoirs. This is because soil sensors 
only have a particular spatial radius where they are effective. However, the unmanned aerial 
vehicle technologies do exhibit economies of scale, and the unquestionable improvement in these 
technologies is likely to further increase consolidation in the farming sector. The average farm 
size in the region has risen from 750 acres in 2002 to 820 acres in 2012 (USDA, 2012). 
Improved sensing technologies are likely to augment this trend. 
As costs associated with unmanned aerial vehicles or their services decrease and 
monitoring applications increase, the aircraft are likely to surpass soil moisture sensors in terms 
of both cost-effectiveness of aquifer savings and net returns. Given that the most attractive policy 
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alternative among the farming community also comes at the greatest cost to society, it may be 
that widespread implementation of one of these practices depends on a continued drop in costs. 
Future work should continue to explore the role of precision technology and high-resolution 
monitoring in agriculture by giving needed attention to adapting best practices to region-specific 
constraints. Toward this goal, it will be important to continue to characterize the benefits and 
costs of these applications under different environmental and economic conditions. 
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II. Flexible Estimation of Groundwater and Time Preferences  
Co-authors: Kent Kovacs, Rodolfo Nayga Jr., and Heather Snell 
 Choice experiments (CE) are common in economics to evaluate consumer preferences for 
market and non-market goods (e.g., Lusk and Schroeder, 2004; Louviere and Lancsar, 2009; 
Johnston et al., 2017; Thiene et al., 2017), and many applications of CE involve non-market 
goods that deliver a flow of services over time.  Only two studies jointly estimate time 
preferences with CE data through random parameter models, using choice scenarios that either 
vary the payment horizon (Lew 2018) or vary the timing of future benefits (Meyer 2013a,b) to 
elicit joint preferences.  Lew (2018) and Meyer (2013a,b) examine whether time preferences 
have an exponential form, which assumes a constant discount rate over time, or a hyperbolic 
form, which allows discount rates to decline over time.  Lew (2018) assumes the time parameter 
to be the same for all the respondents, and Meyer (2013a,b) assumes the time parameter is 
normally distributed among respondents.  Even the assumption that a random time parameter has 
a parametric distribution, such as the normal distribution, is limiting (Train, 2016).  We utilize a 
generalization of the logit-mixed logit model (LML) in Train (2016) to identify the shape of the 
distribution of the time parameter.                    
For flexibility in estimating the distribution of random parameters, the LML supposes 
that the probability of each parameter value in finite parameter space comes from a logit function 
with terms defined by the researcher to describe the shape of the distribution.  The LML has the 
researcher choose a polynomial, spline, or other step function to guide, in the estimation, the 
search for the shape of the parameter’s distribution.  To our knowledge, no study uses the LML 
to identify implicit discount rates through the joint estimation of time preferences and CE data.  
Our extension, hereafter called the discounted logit-mixed logit (D-LML), helps practitioners 
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learn about heterogeneity in the time parameter for a particular good as well as in the utility 
coefficients for the observed attributes of that good.  We show that the advantage provided by 
flexible mixing distributions in the D-LML enables hyperbolic discounting models to represent 
heterogeneity in the time parameter such that some individuals can take on values that 
approximate exponential discounting.  The D-LML also has significant advantage in 
computation time compared to a discounted mixed logit (D-MXL) since the probability of a 
person’s choices does not depend on the parameters being estimated and therefore does not 
change during the estimation (Train, 2016).   
Policy makers would benefit from greater knowledge about the value of groundwater 
services (NRC, 1997; Tentes and Damigos, 2015).  Since meaningful aquifer change occurs over 
decades, present value calculations are useful for valuation and policy deliberation related to 
groundwater.  An understanding of time preferences for the flow of groundwater services is 
necessary for those present value calculations.  The commonly held assumption that people apply 
the same time preferences to utility from different sources of consumption may not be true 
(Ubfal, 2016).  An average person might be more impatient about the consumption of 
environmental goods such as groundwater services or foods than about money or other goods.  
This makes the joint estimation of time preferences with the choice of a particular good critical 
for policy makers responsible for managing the intertemporal flow of services from that good.  
Our CE data come from a survey about the protection of groundwater in the Mississippi 
River Valley Alluvial Aquifer (MRVA).  In the following section, we review stated preference 
literature surrounding discount rates and discuss some of the deficiencies with existing CE 
studies that examine groundwater.  Most notably, common deficiencies include a lack of 
consideration for time preferences, realistic long-term environmental scenarios, or a 
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representative range of groundwater services.  We detail choice models and an experimental 
design intended to address these deficiencies with groundwater studies while providing new 
evidence about the nature and form of people’s time preferences using flexibly mixed random 
parameters.  We estimate and compare model specifications for the D-LML that assume 
exponential discounting, different forms of hyperbolic discounting, and a quasi-hyperbolic form 
to the time parameter.  Discounting most closely exhibits the quasi-hyperbolic form with large 
importance given to immediate utility.  Time preferences are not normally distributed, and 
instead exhibit multimodality and asymmetry with one group of individuals taking on discount 
rates that approach zero, a second group taking on rates around 40%, and a third group with 
discount rates larger than 80%.  Sensitivity models indicate that time preferences are robust 
when accounting for high levels of perceived consequentiality (Vossler and Watson, 2013) or for 
attribute non-attendance (ANA) (Mariel et al., 2013; Caputo et al., 2018a).   
Literature review 
Stated time preferences 
 Past studies estimating implicit discount rates with stated preference data have used either 
exogenous or endogenous discounting approaches (Wang and Daziano, 2015).  Endogenous 
approaches estimate a discount rate parameter directly within the valuation model, while 
exogenous approaches require additional estimations outside of the model or else supplemental 
questions to infer discount rates then applied to the choice analysis.  Most exogenous discounting 
studies leverage a two-step approach where the researcher computes the discount rate after 
estimating willingness to pay (WTP) for two different periods or payment horizons.  This 
approach has been used in a variety of contexts, including studies examining wait-time values at 
ski lifts (Crocker and Shogren, 1993), salmon restoration value (Stevens et al, 1997), and oyster 
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reef restoration value (Kim and Haab, 2009).  All of these contingent valuation (CV) studies 
assumed exponential discounting.  Myers et al. (2017) calculated an implicit discount rate after 
estimating WTPs in present values for a one-time payment and for ongoing annual payments 
using CV data about protecting migratory shorebirds in the eastern U.S.  Among studies that use 
CE data, Layton and Brown (2000) employed the two-step approach after administering separate 
survey samples involving scenarios with different time horizons for realizing forest losses.  
Viscusi et al. (2008), examining water quality, estimated WTP as a function of the time until 
improvements would occur by including the timing of water quality benefits as an attribute in the 
CE.  They calculated discount rates under both exponential and hyperbolic discounting 
assumptions.   
 Fewer studies have opted to use supplemental survey questions to estimate discount rates 
exogenously.  Newell and Siikamäki (2014) added a set of questions to their CE survey 
commonly used in experimental economics for eliciting individual discount rates (e.g. Coller and 
Williams, 1999), and they applied estimated rates within their CE analysis.  Egan et al. (2015) 
used a reward lottery with actual payoffs, following Harrison et al. (2002), to separately estimate 
discount rates and then apply them to a CV of wetland restoration.  Among exogenous 
discounting studies, only Viscusi et al. (2008) estimated implicit discount rates under alternative 
assumptions about discounting behavior to the standard exponential form. 
          Endogenous discounting studies use variations either in the payment horizon (e.g., Kovacs 
and Larson, 2008; Bond et al., 2009) or the timing of future benefits (Meyer 2013a, b) in order to 
identify the implied discount rate directly within the valuation model.  Kovacs and Larson (2008) 
conducted a CV that included survey treatments with T=1, 4, 7, or 10-year payment horizons.  
Bond et al., (2009) used CV survey treatments with T=1, 5, or 10-year payment horizons.  Both 
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studies used a valuation model which imposes present-value costs by adding a cumulative 
discount factor to the cost term that takes on the exponential form.  Sample variation in the 
payment horizon makes it possible to identify the discount rate parameter included in this term.  
Kovacs and Larson (2008) estimated an annual exponential discount rate around 30%, while 
Bond et al. (2009) estimated rates ranging from 23% to 80%.  Both sets of findings point to 
annual discount rates much larger than would typically be used in policy analysis (e.g. 3-7%).  
Lew (2018) conducted a CE with T=1, 5, and 10-year payments to identify implicit discount 
rates associated with the protection of an endangered species and found an annual exponential 
discount rate of 122%.   
 Meyer (2013a, b) identified implicit discount rates from CE data by varying the timing of 
future benefits.  Meyer (2013a, b) specified a random utility model (RUM) that discounts the 
flows of both costs and benefits over time, unlike other studies which have discounted only 
costs.  Meyer (2013b) estimated a much smaller annual exponential discount rate of 13%.  Both 
Lew (2018) and Meyer (2013a, b) estimated discount rates under assumptions of alternative 
discounting, though neither found evidence to reject the exponential discounting form of steady 
discount rates over time. 
Groundwater CE studies 
 Groundwater resources generate a range of beneficial services, both direct (e.g., 
extractive uses) and indirect (e.g., subsidence avoidance), and their provision flows over time.  A 
CE enables researchers to elicit marginal valuations for specific services to understand their 
relative importance and groundwater’s total economic value (TEV).  Existing groundwater CEs 
typically oversimplify their environmental scenarios either by limiting the range of services 
considered (e.g., Tempesta and Vecchiato, 2013), ignoring time discounting (e.g., Birol et al., 
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2010; Tempesta and Vecchiato, 2013; Koundouri et al., 2014a, b; Tentes and Damigos, 2015), or 
ignoring realistic temporal and environmental dynamics (e.g., Meyer, 2013a, b).  Birol et al. 
(2010) used a CE to estimate WTP for promoting aquifer recharge in Cyprus.  They estimated 
marginal WTP values for water quality, water quantity, agricultural employment, and habitat, 
and respondents displayed positive and significant WTP for each.  About a third of the sample is 
farmers and the other two-thirds is the general public.  Water quality was valued most by the 
general public, while farmers placed greater value on water quantity.  Koundouri et al. (2014a) 
and Tentes and Damigos (2015) performed CE studies that value the Asopos River Basin and 
Aquifer in Greece.  Koundouri et al. (2014a) produced marginal estimates associated with water 
quality, impact on the local economy, suitable water uses, and water bill costs.  Respondents 
indicated that the moderate water quality condition was valued most.  Koundouri et al. (2014b) 
estimated social values for water quantity, recreation, and land income associated with 
groundwater in Northern Finland, with the largest values observed for water quantity.  Tempesta 
and Vecchiato (2013) used a CE to jointly estimate WTP values for groundwater quality and 
surface water quality, with greatest value placed on low levels of nitrogen concentration in 
groundwater.  Only Birol et al. (2010), Koundouri et al. (2014a, b), and Tentes and Damigos 
(2015) examined multiple groundwater services, and none of these studies estimated discount 
rates in the context of groundwater management.  Meyer (2013a, b) estimated endogenous 
discount rates through variation in the timing of river basin cleanup.  However, the CE used 
unrealistic hypothetical scenarios that asked study participants to abstract from the reality of time 
lags and imagine that the river basin is “magically” cleaned to the specified level and then 
becomes unclean again at specified points in time with no delays.  We fill a need in the literature 
by jointly estimating marginal WTP values for a range of groundwater services with endogenous 
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discount rates using a CE with scenarios that incorporate realistic temporal dynamics of the 
environmental benefits under consideration. 
Methods 
 Intertemporal utility and time preference functions 
 Public goods policies such as those for the long-term management of groundwater 
resources exemplify choices that realize benefits and costs at different points in time.  Money 
invested today in groundwater savings can produce benefits that continue into the future.  In fact, 
meaningful benefits from groundwater savings may not accrue or begin to be realized until a 
policy has been underway for some years.  Measuring the way individuals tend to discount future 
costs and benefits of groundwater management allows policy makers to appropriately weigh in 
present-value terms the costs of actions now against the benefits that will accrue over time.  
Individuals typically discount the utility they receive from future outcomes relative to the utility 
of current outcomes.  Samuelson (1937) developed the first discounted utility model for 
intertemporal choice commonly known as the exponential discounting model, estimating a single 
discount rate parameter.  This is the standard model for intertemporal utility, largely because of 
its simplicity (Meyer, 2013a; Frederick, 2002).  The exponential discounting function takes the 
form of 
𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐0, 𝑐𝑐1, … , 𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇) =  �𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡),
𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=0
 
where the discount factor for year t is 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 =  �
1
1+𝜌𝜌
�
𝑡𝑡
 and 𝜌𝜌 is the discount rate. 
Alternative functional forms of discounted utility have been developed in order to 
reconcile the many situations in which the exponential model does not fit behavior.  For 
example, inferred discount rates have been found to decline over time (Cairns and van der Pol, 
(9) 
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2000), fitting a functional form termed hyperbolic discounting.  Hyperbolic discounting in its 
most popular form is described by 
 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 =  (1 + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)−𝛽𝛽/𝛼𝛼, where 𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽 > 0 
 (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992).  As α approaches zero, this function becomes the exponential 
discounting function.  Harvey (1986) imposes a single-parameter structure on Equation 2 to 
facilitate estimation of the function by constraining α to be equal to one.  The hyperbolic form 
described by Harvey is then 
𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 =  (1 + 𝛼𝛼)−𝜇𝜇 . 
Note that as 𝜇𝜇 approaches infinity, discounting approximates the exponential form.  Herrnstein 
(1981) and Mazur (1987) (HM) constrain the term, β/α, to be equal to one: 
𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 =  (1 + 𝜔𝜔𝛼𝛼)−1, 
and note here that it becomes the exponential form as 𝜔𝜔 approaches zero.  More recently, a 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting model has received attention in which especially large importance 
is placed on immediate utility as compared to deferred utility (Meyer, 2013a; Frederick, 2002).  
The functional form, developed by Laibson (1997), is given by 
𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 =  �
1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛼𝛼 = 0 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝛽𝛽 � 11 + 𝜌𝜌�
𝑡𝑡
 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛼𝛼 > 0
�  ,𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 0 < 𝛽𝛽 < 1,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 �
1
1 + 𝜌𝜌
�
𝑡𝑡
< 1. 
The quasi-hyperbolic model deviates from the exponential model only in that all future time 
periods are discounted by an additional β factor. 
Hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounters weight the near future less heavily than 
exponential discounters but place a greater weight on deferred utility far in the future.  
Furthermore, exponential discounters are time consistent because their marginal discount rate is 
constant over all time periods, while hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounters are 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
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dynamically inconsistent.  Quasi-hyperbolic discounters have a large marginal discount rate 
between time period 0 (the present) and time period 1 and then a constant marginal discount rate 
in all periods after.  In this way, quasi-hyperbolic discounters behave as exponential discounters 
for any choice not involving the present.  Hyperbolic discounters may be dynamically 
inconsistent for any potential time period but are likely to exhibit greater dynamic inconsistency 
for tradeoffs that occur nearer to the present than for tradeoffs that occur far in the future (Meyer, 
2013a).1   
We integrate the time preference functions from Equation 1 (exponential), Equation 3 
(Harvey), Equation 4 (HM), and Equation 5 (quasi-hyperbolic) into a D-LML model and 
compare estimated models for best fit similar to Meyer (2013a; 2013b) and Lew (2018).  Meyer 
(2013a; 2013b) and Lew (2018) assume that discount rates are normally distributed in the 
population.  The purpose of this study is to use flexible distributional assumptions about discount 
rates to retrieve time preferences with more realistic distributions because the flexible 
distributions allow for multimodality and asymmetry.    
 Empirical model 
 We evaluate marginal WTP for two groundwater policy alternatives and five different 
groundwater services in addition to estimating endogenous discount rates.  We use a WTP-space 
specification (Train and Weeks, 2005) in our analysis so that flexible distributions of WTP for 
marginal groundwater services and policy alternatives can be estimated directly.  Given the panel 
nature of the choice data in our study, correlation in the stochastic portion of utility is probable.  
We use a panel specification of the D-LML and allow for correlations in marginal WTP. 
 
                                                 
1 Please refer to Meyer (2013a) and Frederick et al. (2002) for a more thorough discussion of intertemporal utility 
and time preference functions. 
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 The Discounted Logit-mixed Logit (D-LML) Model 
To analyze the discrete choice data involving intertemporal goods, let the additively 
separable utility through time period 𝑇𝑇 for an individual i for alternative j in choice situation k be 
given by 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  �𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�−𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + (𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖)′𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,
𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=0
 
where 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the individual discount factor for year t; 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  ∑ 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0  is the weighted sum of 
all instantaneous error draws weighted each period by the discount factor, 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡, and is assumed to 
be distributed iid extreme value; 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 is a random scalar representing the cost/scale parameter; 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 denotes the individual cost of the policy alternative in year t; 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖 is a vector of estimated 
marginal WTPs; and 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is a vector of observed groundwater service attributes for the 
alternative in year t.  Conditional on 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 and the vector <𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖, 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖>, the probability that person i 
makes a sequence of choices over K choice situations is the logit formula: 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖, < 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖 >) =  �
𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1
𝐾𝐾
𝑖𝑖=1
. 
The researcher does not observe the utility coefficients of each individual and knows that they 
vary over individuals.  The cumulative distribution function of (𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 , < 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 ,𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖 >) in the population 
is F(𝜓𝜓, < 𝜆𝜆,𝜔𝜔 >), which Train (2016) calls the mixing distribution.  We let F be discrete with 
finite support set S.  The discretization is not a constraint because the support grid can 
approximate a continuous distribution to any degree of accuracy with a sufficiently broad and 
dense S (Train, 2016; Caputo et al., 2018b).  Let us denote the vector containing <𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖,𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖> and 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 
for individual i as 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖.  The probability mass at any 𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻 ∈ 𝑆𝑆 is expressed as an additional logit 
term, 
(6) 
(7) 
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𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃(𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻) ≡ W(𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻|α) =  
𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼′𝑧𝑧(𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟)
∑ 𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼′𝑧𝑧(𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠∈𝑆𝑆
, 
where 𝑧𝑧(𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻) is a vector-valued function of 𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻 defining the shape of the mixing distribution and 𝛼𝛼 
is a corresponding vector of probability mass coefficients.2  The summation in the denominator 
of the additional logit terms assures that the probabilities sum to one (Train, 2016).   
The unconditional choice probability of the sequence of choices of individual i is then: 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝛼𝛼) = � W(𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻|α) ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻) =
𝐻𝐻∈𝑆𝑆
� �
𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼′𝑧𝑧(𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟)
∑ 𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼′𝑧𝑧(𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠∈𝑆𝑆
� ∙ ��
𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖=1
𝐾𝐾
𝑖𝑖=1
� ,
𝐻𝐻∈𝑆𝑆
 
containing one logit term for the probability that the decision-maker chooses a sequence of 
choices and a logit term for the probability that the decision-maker has coefficients 𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻, a vector 
of marginal WTPs and a discount factor.   
Structure can be placed on the type of discounting using the formulas described in section 
2.1.  This allows us to avoid imposing the unrealistic data requirements necessary for 
estimating 𝜓𝜓𝑡𝑡 at any time t.  This specification also facilitates hypothesis testing between the 
functional forms for discounting (Meyer, 2013a).  We estimate D-LML models, including 
random discount rate parameters that are flexibly mixed, for each of the four discounting 
structures: exponential, Harvey, HM, and quasi-hyperbolic. 
 Model Estimation Strategy 
 To estimate the model, the log-likelihood function for α is given by 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 =  �𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎��W(𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻|α) ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻)
𝐻𝐻∈𝑆𝑆
�
𝐼𝐼
𝑖𝑖=1
. 
                                                 
2 Refer to Train (2016) and Caputo et al. (2017) for a thorough discussion of the options for specifying z variables. 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
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In order to evaluate a sufficiently large and dense S, we simulate the log-likelihood function by 
using random draws of 𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻 for each individual.  Letting 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ⊂ 𝑆𝑆 be a subset of R randomly selected 
values of 𝜃𝜃, the simulated log-likelihood function is then, 
𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 =  �𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎��𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖(𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻|α) ∙ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻)
𝐻𝐻∈𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
�
𝐼𝐼
𝑖𝑖=1
, 
where 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 is the logit formula based on subset 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖: 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖(𝜃𝜃𝐻𝐻|α) =  
𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼′𝑧𝑧(𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟)
∑ 𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼′𝑧𝑧(𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠)𝑠𝑠∈𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
. 
The estimator selects the value of 𝛼𝛼 that maximizes the SLL function. 
We use splines in the form 𝛼𝛼′𝑧𝑧(𝜃𝜃) to flexibly define the mixing distributions.  Caputo et 
al. (2018b) compared LML models using splines, polynomials, and step functions and observed 
that polynomials and splines outperformed step functions in most cases in terms of overall model 
fit.3  In our own modeling analysis, the polynomials required substantially longer estimation 
times than splines while offering no clear advantage in terms of model fit or distributional 
smoothness.  We use a spline specification of z with 8 knots because it produced the smoothest 
distributions.4 
The support range, S, needs to be defined a-priori, and the extremes of the support range 
define the highest and lowest marginal WTP values or time parameter values in the parameter 
space. Train (2016) recommended using a range that spans two standard deviations (2SD) on 
either side of the mean estimated from a MXL model with normally distributed random 
parameters.  Caputo et al. (2018b) investigated the sensitivity of LML results to variations in the 
                                                 
3 Splines, polynomials, and step functions all outperformed a MXL model using normally distributed random 
parameters (Caputo et al., 2017). 
4 See Caputo et al. (2017) and especially the seminal paper by Train (2016) for a detailed discussion of specifying z 
variables for the mixing distribution. 
(10
1) 
(12) 
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support range and suggested that the researcher can obtain guidance about the optimal range by 
visual inspection of the histograms showing the flexible mixing distributions.  In particular, the 
researcher can extend the upper or lower range limits whenever there is a high probability mass 
in the highest and/or lowest bin of the histogram (Caputo et al., 2018b).  High probability mass 
in the tails of the distribution suggests that some individuals predicted to have parameter values 
at the upper (lower) end of the range in fact have larger (smaller) values outside of the 
investigated support range (Caputo et al., 2018b).  We followed an estimation approach similar 
to Caputo et al. (2018b), beginning first by estimating D-MXL models with normally distributed 
random parameters.  The price/scale parameter, 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖, for the D-MXL models was distributed 
lognormal.  Next, we estimated D-LML models with the support range extending 2SD above and 
below the mean parameter estimates.  The lower range of the price/scale parameter we set equal 
to zero.  Then, using visual inspection we extended the upper (lower) range limit any time we 
observed a high probability mass in the highest (lowest) bin of the histogram.  The lower range 
of the price/scale parameter remained set to zero.   
We include alternative-specific constants (ASCs) in our models that represent labeled 
choice alternatives different from the reference status quo.  We estimate models with covariance 
in the marginal WTPs due to the probability of correlated WTPs.  The D-LML model accounts 
for scale heterogeneity, since each utility coefficient includes 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 (Hess and Train, 2017).5  The 
results we believe are the best come from the D-LML models obtained using visual inspection to 
guide the choice of supports.  The D-MXL results and the D-LML results obtained using the 
                                                 
5 When utility parameters are uncorrelated in a model, variation in λi can reflect whatever sources of correlation may 
be present beyond scale heterogeneity (Hess and Train, 2017).  Although our model estimates covariance between 
the marginal WTPs, we do assume the time parameter to be uncorrelated with WTPs in the model, and variation in 
λi may reflect sources of correlation between the WTPs and the discount rate. 
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2SD decision rule are in Appendix A.  All model estimates come from MATLAB (version 
2019a) using 1000 Halton draws.       
 Experimental design and questionnaire 
 For eliciting groundwater and time preferences, we chose to conduct a CE involving 
MRVA outcomes.  Respondents choose among three groundwater management policy 
alternatives, including a surface water infrastructure (SWI) alternative, a cap and trade (C/T) 
alternative, and a status quo (SQ) alternative involving no change to current MRVA groundwater 
management.  There is little information available about people’s preferences for a C/T 
groundwater permits marketplace because it is not an alternative currently receiving widespread 
consideration.  However, stated preference methods are a valuable way to elicit preferences for 
new goods and services, so we chose to include it here to provide some evidence for 
consideration in the MRVA context.  Initiatives to expand surface water infrastructure are 
currently promoted within several critical areas of the MRVA along with other best management 
practices (BMPs).  We include the alternative focused on additional infrastructure to offer 
another alternative different from the SQ alternative that is grounded within current policy 
frameworks operating in the MRVA.  Information about each alternative is clearly provided to 
survey respondents, and each respondent must successfully answer comprehension questions 
about each alternative before advancing in the survey.    
We conducted a focus group to determine the most appropriate attributes for the CE 
design, collecting information about the socio-environmental services people value from MRVA 
groundwater.  Focus group participants also reviewed survey questionnaire sections related to the 
MRVA and potential policy alternatives, discussing clarity, comprehension, and difficulty.  This 
feedback, together with existing conceptual frameworks for groundwater valuation (NRC, 1997), 
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guide the selection of the CE attributes.  There are five main groundwater services, or attributes, 
that we identify contributing to the MRVA’s TEV.  These are water quality for irrigated 
agriculture, the provision of jobs in the agricultural economy, the provision of habitat for 
maintaining wildlife, especially fish and waterfowl for local tourism, the avoidance of 
subsidence and its associated infrastructure costs, and the certainty of adequate water supply in 
case of drought (buffer).  We rely on existing hydrologic (Clark et al., 2013) and economic 
(Kovacs et al., 2015) simulation models to help in setting realistic attribute levels for the SQ 
alternative.  The attributes and levels in our CE are shown in Table 1. 
We express all attribute levels as percentage values in order to lessen the difficulty of 
comparing alternatives across multiple attributes.6  Levels indicate outcomes for the year 2050 
and appear in terms of a percentage of current levels, so that 100% indicates no change from 
current levels.  We include a cost attribute using an increase to state income taxes for the 
household as the payment mechanism.   
To identify time preferences, we employ a split-sample design and vary the timing of the 
expenses associated with the cost attribute.  Respondents are randomly assigned to specific 
treatments for the cost attribute that include perpetual annual payments beginning in the current 
tax year, perpetual annual payments beginning in the following tax year, a single lump payment 
for the current tax year, and a single lump payment for the following tax year.  By varying the 
onset and duration of the payment mechanism in the choice sets, endogenous estimation of the 
time preference parameters within the discount factor for the exponential, hyperbolic, and quasi-
hyperbolic functional forms is possible (Meyer, 2013a; 2013b).  The range of the lump payment 
cost attribute levels is similar to Meyer (2013a; 2013b) and Viscusi et al. (2008).  Following 
                                                 
6 Johnston et al. (2016) use this practice in a CE with three alternatives and six environmental attributes. 
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Egan et al. (2015), we convert lump payment levels to perpetual payment levels using a 25% 
discount rate and rounding to equal-interval dollar amounts in order to present similarly scaled 
cost levels across treatments in the absence of known discount rates.   
Table 1. Attribute definitions and levels 
Attribute Definition Levelsa,b 
Buffer Quantity The percentage of current acres with 
adequate groundwater for 5 consecutive 
drought years 
25%, 40%, 55%, 70% 
Water Quality The percentage of current acres with 
adequate groundwater quality for 
irrigation 
75%, 80%, 85%, 90% 
Jobs from Irrigated Agriculture The percentage of current (120,000) 
jobs 
80%, 90%, 100%, 110% 
Wildlife Diversity and 
Abundance 
The percentage of current wildlife 
diversity and abundance 
75%, 80%, 85%, 90% 
Infrastructure Integrity The percentage of current infrastructure 
integrity 
75%, 80%, 85%, 90% 
Cost to Household (lump) The one-time dollar increase in state 
income taxes 
$0, $30, $90, $150, $210, $270 
Cost to Household (perpetual) The permanent dollar increase in state 
income taxes 
$0, $12, $24, $36, $48, $60 
a The status quo levels are indicated in bold. 
b Levels indicate outcomes for the year 2050 and 100% indicates no change from current levels. 
 
We used a three-stage sequential Bayesian approach to construct the experimental design 
(Bliemer et al., 2008; Scarpa et al., 2007; Scarpa and Rose, 2008).  Using the software Ngene 
and uninformative priors, we constructed an efficient design for use in a pilot survey (Bliemer et 
al., 2008).  Parameter priors from the pilot study (n=203) then updated a Bayesian efficient 
design (Scarpa and Rose, 2008).  We selected a design with 30 choice sets to achieve attribute 
level balance and grouped these into six blocks to reduce the number of choice sets each 
respondent must complete.  With six block groups, respondents answer five choice sets each.  
The levels for the SQ alternative, including no additional household cost, are constant throughout 
the experimental design.  Figure 1 shows an example of a choice set. 
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Figure 1.  Example choice task 
Growing literatures suggest that stated preference survey designs should account for 
known biases in stated preferences that can occur due to low perceived consequentiality (e.g., 
Vossler et al., 2012; Vossler and Watson, 2013; Zawojska et al., 2015) and hypothetical bias 
(e.g., List and Gallet, 2001; Lusk and Schroeder, 2004).  We use recommended best practices 
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intended to potentially reduce these known biases.  By including text to enhance the perceived 
consequentiality of survey responses with respect to potential policy outcomes, field experiments 
show that respondents put more effort into providing truthful responses (Vossler et al., 2012; 
Zawojska et al., 2015).  A “cheap talk” script that reminds respondents about the constraints of 
their household budget can be an effective means to reduce hypothetical bias (Cummings and 
Taylor, 1999).  We employ these design elements to limit bias in our stated preference data.7 
The survey questionnaire begins with a brief overview and questions to collect 
information about topic familiarity and perception of water resources, environment, and society.  
Using language to augment the perceived consequentiality of the study (Vossler et al., 2012), 
respondents read that their groundwater management preferences from the survey will be shared 
with the Arkansas Natural Resources Commission and other stakeholders and might affect how 
Arkansas actually manages its groundwater resources.  Specifically, respondents read that their 
responses could be used as advice on whether to implement new groundwater management 
policies, and that the likelihood that a particular alternative occurs could increase with the 
number of “yes” votes for that alternative.  Respondents also read a bulleted list of information 
discussing aquifers, socio-environmental services from the MRVA, and MRVA groundwater 
availability and management.  This section includes a map depicting the current depth to MRVA 
groundwater across eastern Arkansas. 
Before completing the choice sets for the CE, respondents read that they will make a 
series of hypothetical voting decisions between two policy alternatives for managing 
groundwater resources and a SQ option representing no change to groundwater management 
                                                 
7 See Appendix A for the precise language used in the consequentiality and cheap talk scripts of the CE instrument. 
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policy.  The respondents also see detailed descriptions about the SQ, SWI, and C/T alternatives.8  
Instructions that follow describe the attributes and the payment mechanism in the choice sets.  To 
construct a groundwater scenario with realistic long-term dynamics, attribute levels presented for 
each alternative represent projections for the year 2050, and levels for the SQ alternative capture 
the evolving state of groundwater resources if no policy change occurs.  Respondents read that 
the rate of decline (or change) from the current (100%) levels to the 2050 levels is steady over 
the approximately 30-year time horizon, and the levels in 2050 then remain constant into the 
future.  This language is to minimize confounding factors by establishing a common reference 
point for all respondents.  Each must confirm that they understand the timing of the payment 
mechanism, read the consequentiality language again, and view an example choice set.  In 
addition, just prior to beginning the actual choice sets, we employ a “cheap talk” script to reduce 
hypothetical bias (Cummings and Taylor, 1999), and respondents have the option to review the 
detailed descriptions about the groundwater management alternatives again.   
We randomize the assignment of choice question blocks and the order in which the 
choice sets appear in each block.  Above each choice set is a reminder that socio-environmental 
attribute levels decline steadily and then remain constant into the future.  The levels of the SQ 
alternative are fixed, so we place it always in the left most column of the choice set table to make 
it easy for respondents to compare alternatives across multiple sets.  However, we randomize the 
placement of the columns for the SWI and C/T alternatives to avoid any ordering effects.  
Following the choice tasks, we ask respondents how difficult the policy choice sets are to 
understand and how certain they are about their choices, as well as their opinions about whether 
the management policy alternatives are realistic and feasible.  We measure stated ANA by asking 
                                                 
8 For reminder, these abbreviate the status quo, surface water infrastructure, and cap and trade alternatives, 
respectively. 
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if respondents never ignored, sometimes ignored, or always ignored each of the respective 
attributes.  We then measure the extent to which respondents believe their choices and those 
made by other survey respondents are going to receive consideration by Arkansas policy makers, 
a measure of perceived consequentiality.  The survey concludes with questions about socio-
demographic information. 
Survey Sample and Data 
 This study elicits preferences for long-term groundwater management policies 
implemented at the state level.  We concentrate on sampling voting-aged residents of Arkansas, 
where the dominant portion of the MRVA is located and the most groundwater use occurs.  
Between August 27th and October 17th of 2018, we administered a stated preference survey 
regarding long-term MRVA groundwater management and outcomes using the survey research 
firm, Qualtrics.  Approximately 800 adult residents of Arkansas voluntarily accessed the four 
versions of the internet-based survey from proprietary research panels and other internet 
sources.9  The survey is designed to be compatible with both traditional and mobile internet 
platforms.  Individuals receive financial incentive for participating in Qualtrics surveys.  
Qualtrics filters responses for quality to remove duplicates from a single individual or any 
observation with a total response time less than one-third the median total response time.  
Incomplete responses are dropped from the analysis, leaving 777 usable survey responses and 
data for 11,655 choice occasions (each person sees five choice sets, and each choice set includes 
three choice occasions because there are three alternatives for each choice set).  Table 2 
summarizes the choice selections by alternative and treatment.   
                                                 
9 The treatments used in this paper are part of a larger project that includes more treatments for other research 
questions.  Details of the full experiment can be found on the American Economic Association’s registry for 
randomized controlled trials (RCT ID: AEARCTR-0003247). 
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Overall, the sample is a close representation of the target population.  Relative to the 
general population of Arkansas residents, our sample shares characteristics for median income 
and unemployment rate while being slightly older (median age 42 compared to 38), more female 
(66% to 51.5%), and more educated (30.1% with bachelor’s degree to 23.4%) (US Census 
Bureau, 2018).10  Statistics on voters and registered voters in the US suggest that the voting 
electorate shares these same biases relative to the general population (File, 2018), supplying 
added confidence in the validity of the stated preferences for groundwater policies. 
Table 2. Summary of choice selections by treatment 
Alternative Perpetual Perpetual delayed Lump Lump delayed 
SWI 373 358 381 343 
C/T 266 319 290 286 
SQ 296 313 304 356 
 
The spatial distribution of the sample (based on self-reported Zip Codes) also closely 
represents Arkansas’s actual population density.  Comparing sample proportions across 
Arkansas’s 75 counties to the Census population proportions via the Mann-Whitney test shows 
no significant difference (p-value=0.259).  Most respondents (89%) indicated some degree of 
belief that their responses would be given consideration by Arkansas policy makers.  The 
perceived feasibility of the policy alternatives has a five-point scale where one represents “very 
unrealistic and infeasible” and five represents “very realistic and feasible.”  The mean feasibility 
score of the SWI alternative is 3.43 with just 6.3% who find it very unrealistic and infeasible.  
On the other hand, 17.1% find it very realistic and feasible.  For the C/T alternative, the mean 
feasibility score is 3.29.  A slightly larger percentage (7.9%) find it very unrealistic and 
                                                 
10 A table with summary statistics of overall sample demographics is provided in Appendix A. 
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infeasible when compared to the SWI alternative.  Similarly, a smaller percentage (14.9%) find 
the C/T alternative to be very realistic and feasible.        
Respondents were randomly assigned to treatments which varied the timing of the cost 
attribute.  We find balance in observable demographic characteristics across the treatments using 
one-way ANOVA (means) and the Chi-square goodness-of-fit test (proportions) (see Table 3).  
The treatments also exhibit no significant differences in terms of perceived consequentiality, 
question difficulty, answer certainty, or perceived feasibility of alternatives.11 
Table 3. Summary of demographic statistics and treatment sample balance 
Characteristic Perpetual Perpetual delayed Lump 
Lump 
delayed F, χ² 
p-
value 
N 187 198 195 197   
Age, mean 45.2 44.3 44.0 43.7 0.74 0.389 
Household size, 
mean 2.89 2.92 2.74 2.89 0.22 0.643 
Household income     4.80 0.851 
   $0 - $39,999 46.5% 50.5% 45.6% 41.1%   
   $40,000 - $69,999 18.7% 19.7% 22.6% 22.8%   
   $70,000 - $99,999 17.1% 15.2% 15.9% 16.8%   
   $100,000+ 17.6% 14.6% 15.9% 19.3%   
Female 65.8% 65.2% 67.2% 66.0% 0.19 0.979 
Education     5.81 0.445 
   High school or 
less 26.2% 31.8% 24.6% 29.9% 
  
   Some college 44.4% 41.4% 44.6% 36.5%   
   College graduate 29.4% 26.8% 30.8% 33.5%   
Married 58.8% 60.1% 54.9% 57.4% 1.21 0.750 
Unemployed 4.8%  3.5%  3.6%  5.6%  1.39  0.707 
 
Results 
 Table 4 presents the results of the D-LML models estimated for each of the four 
discounting assumptions: exponential discounting (Model I.a), Harvey hyperbolic discounting 
                                                 
11 Each was measured on a 5-point scale where 1 equals not at all difficult (certain, feasible, or taken into account by 
policy makers) and 5 equals very difficult (certain, feasible) or definitely taken into account by policy makers.  
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(Model I.b), HM hyperbolic discounting (Model I.c), and QH discounting (Model I.d).  The time 
parameter estimated depends on the type of discounting assumed.  Utility estimates show mean 
marginal WTP in net present value (NPV) along with standard deviations for a 1% increase in 
marginal groundwater services and for the implementation of alternative groundwater 
management policies.  We scaled the cost of each alternative to improve estimation, so the 
marginal groundwater service valuations in Table 4 reflect tens of dollars.  We report bootstrap 
standard errors based on bootstrap 95% confidence intervals (CIs) (Appendix A) and use these to 
guide our interpretation of model results.  Specifically, we interpret the β time parameter in the 
QH model to be significant when the bootstrap 95% CIs do not overlap with one, and we 
interpret all other estimates to be significant when CIs do not overlap with zero.  In the absence 
of a proper test for selecting the best performing LML or D-LML models, we follow Caputo et 
al. (2018b) and use standard information criteria.  A lower Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) 
value indicates the better fit. 
All time parameters are significant in the models.  Each of the alternative discounting 
models provides a better fit than the standard exponential discounting model (AIC = 7129.6).  
Among the two hyperbolic discounting models, HM discounting (AIC = 7012.2) provides a 
better fit than Harvey discounting (AIC = 7039.9).  However, the QH discounting model (AIC = 
7005.9) offers the best overall fit, and β is significant at an estimated value of 0.613.  A β 
parameter value of one in the QH discounting model represents no departure from exponential 
discounting, and as the value of β deviates from one and becomes smaller, present-bias becomes 
larger.  With QH discounting providing the best overall model fit and β significant, we find 
strong evidence for present-bias.  Hyperbolic discounting models also support a rejection of the 
exponential discounting assumption.  For example, the HM discounting case approximates the 
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Table 4.  Simulated maximum likelihood results of the D-LML models in WTP-space (best 
supports) 
  
Parameter   I.a (Exp.)     I.b (Harvey)     I.c (HM)     I.d (QH) 
ASC1 (C/T)  1.157   (0.883)   0.794   (0.795)   2.050   (0.914)   1.312   (0.851) 
St. deviation (SD)  6.823* (0.424)  5.316* (0.378)   5.760* (0.443)  7.440* (0.488) 
ASC2 (SWI)  3.845* (0.686)   2.185   (0.815)   2.748* (0.864)   2.956   (0.743) 
SD  5.601* (0.334)  5.092* (0.333)   5.371* (0.412)  8.864* (0.668) 
Buffer  1.291* (0.365)   0.262* (0.095)   0.120* (0.056)   0.522* (0.385) 
SD  1.954* (0.171)   0.400* (0.045)   0.253* (0.029)   2.396* (0.265) 
Quality  1.056* (1.099)   0.314* (0.081)   0.493* (0.078)   0.932* (0.659) 
SD  5.923* (0.610)   0.393* (0.038)   0.428* (0.038)   3.483* (0.372) 
Jobs  0.331* (0.034)   0.197* (0.002)   0.164* (0.119)   0.664* (0.007) 
SD  0.189* (0.017)  0.009* (0.001)   0.025* (0.002)  0.036* (0.003) 
Infrastructure -0.768   (1.040)   0.295* (0.134)   0.164* (0.119)   0.605   (1.119) 
SD  5.651* (0.523)  0.663* (0.091)   0.746* (0.080)  4.444* (0.616) 
Wildlife  1.545* (1.191)   0.086* (0.020)   0.088* (0.120)   0.892* (0.420) 
SD  6.643* (0.675)  0.081* (0.009)   0.679* (0.080)  2.206* (0.204) 
𝜆𝜆 (scale)  0.700* (0.124)   1.963* (0.226)   1.375* (0.205)   0.120* (0.009) 
SD  0.458* (0.079)   1.265* (0.141)   1.145* (0.102)   0.078* (0.006) 
r  0.737* (0.049)        0.626* (0.047) 
SD  0.249* (0.025)      0.265* (0.024) 
u    1.352* (0.085)     
SD   0.439* (0.053)    
w      1.728* (0.044)   
SD    0.210* (0.023)   
β        0.613* (0.042) 
SD        0.176* (0.022) 
Log L -3448.8  -3403.9  -3390.1  -3377.9 
AIC 7129.6  7039.9  7012.2  7005.9 
N 11655  11655  11655  11655 
Note: WTP values are reported as WTP/10.  Multiply estimates by 10 to obtain dollar amounts. 
Note: Bootstrap Standard Errors given in parentheses were obtained using 250 Bootstrap 
samples.  Bootstrap 95% CIs are shown in Appendix A.  
*significant based on 95% CI (tests for β are against 1, all other are against 0)             
exponential form as the time parameter, w, approaches zero.  We estimate w to be much greater 
than zero (1.728) and observe an overall model fit nearly as good as with QH discounting.  We 
estimate the Harvey time parameter is 𝑢𝑢 = 1.352, which is in line with the value of 1.646 
estimated by Lew (2018).  Unlike Lew (2018) however, here Harvey discounting improves 
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model fit relative to exponential discounting.  These results using flexible mixing distributions 
are counter to the findings of Meyer (2013a) and Lew (2018) who found no evidence to reject 
the exponential discounting assumption when using normally distributed random parameters.  
Though it is not our preferred model, we estimate a mean annual exponential discount rate of 
73.7%, larger than the 12.8% in Meyer (2013a) but smaller than the 122% in Lew (2018).  Both 
previous studies used random parameters fit to a normal distribution.12  Comparing to studies 
using CV without random parameters, the exponential discount rate in our study is larger than 
the estimates based on all payment schedules in Kovacs and Larson (2008) and Bond et al. 
(2009). 
Marginal groundwater service valuations vary across the different discounting types as 
with model fit, but there are similarities.  Each of the D-LML models shows significant and 
positive WTP for water quality, groundwater buffer, jobs from agriculture, and wildlife.  In both 
the exponential and the QH discounting models the WTP for the provision of infrastructure 
integrity is not significantly different from zero.  Water quality provision has the largest WTP in 
each of the three best fitting models (Harvey, HM, and QH) and is third-largest in the 
exponential discounting model.  Marginal WTP for the C/T groundwater policy alternative is not 
significant for any of the models and therefore not preferred over current management, 
groundwater services being equal.  The WTP for the SWI alternative is not significant in the 
preferred QH discounting model or the Harvey hyperbolic discounting model but is significant 
and positive in the exponential and HM hyperbolic discounting models.  Looking only at the 
preferred QH discounting model, people on average will pay $9.32 for a 1% increase in water 
quality.  Respondents value wildlife services ($8.92) second to water quality followed by jobs 
                                                 
12 Only Meyer estimated a random parameter for the time parameter. 
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from agriculture ($6.64) and groundwater buffer ($5.22).  Standard deviations of the marginal 
WTPs are all significant, and most are large relative to the mean estimate, meaning some 
individuals have negative WTPs.  The exception is jobs from agriculture, where the WTP 
appears to be less variable in the population and restricted to positive values. 
WTPs for groundwater buffer and infrastructure integrity correlate positively with WTP 
for the C/T policy alternative (Table 5), while the SWI alternative correlates positively with 
wildlife habitat provision.  People who like the C/T policy alternative also tend to like having the 
groundwater services that buffer agriculture against drought and prevent harm to infrastructure, 
and people who like the SWI policy want the groundwater services that provide wildlife, namely 
the duck hunting in the Mississippi flyway.  The SWI alternative and the C/T alternative 
correlate positively with one another, meaning that people who like one policy alternative also 
tend to like the other policy alternative.  Among marginal groundwater services, WTP for 
infrastructure integrity correlates negatively with WTP for jobs from agriculture.  People who 
dislike the infrastructure integrity service that groundwater provides tend to like the support 
groundwater has for jobs in agriculture.   
A consistent difference between the magnitudes of the significant WTPs is apparent 
across the different discounting types (Table 4).  The values in the hyperbolic discounting 
models are smaller than either the QH discounting estimates or the exponential discounting 
estimates, sometimes by an order of magnitude.  Marginal WTPs in the QH discounting model 
are also consistently smaller than with exponential discounting.  Beyond the consistent 
differences in the magnitudes of the WTPs across discounting types, we also observe some small 
differences in the relative importance of the groundwater service attributes.  These observable 
differences across the different discounting types also run counter to the findings in Meyer 
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Table 5. Correlations between marginal WTPs in the D-LML models (best supports) 
 
WTPs   I.d Correlations 
(C/T), (SWI) 0.7148*** (6.6297) 
(C/T), Buffer 0.5663*** (3.2833) 
(C/T), Quality 0.1994       (0.9949) 
(C/T), Jobs 0.0246       (0.1335)     
(C/T), Infra 0.3324*     (1.9098)  
(C/T), Wlife 0.1333       (0.6509) 
(SWI), Buffer 0.4212**   (2.1897) 
(SWI), Quality 0.3080       (1.6354) 
(SWI), Jobs -0.0901     (-0.4779) 
(SWI), Infra 0.4188**   (2.3620)    
(SWI), Wlife 0.3744*     (1.8120) 
Buffer, Quality 0.1039       (0.4604) 
Buffer, Jobs 0.0359       (0.1897) 
Buffer, Infra 0.0254       (0.1220) 
Buffer, Wlife 0.1826       (0.8817) 
Quality, Jobs 0.0159       (0.0786) 
Quality, Infra -0.1681     (-0.7689) 
Quality, Wlife -0.0083     (-0.0364) 
Jobs, Infra -0.4152** (-2.1679)   
Jobs, Wlife 0.0074       (0.0403) 
Infra, Wlife 0.0904       (0.3925) 
Note: T-statistics are given in parentheses.  
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1% 
 
(2013a) and Lew (2018).  Lew (2018) observed almost no differences in the magnitudes or 
rankings of marginal utilities across discounting types likely because the lone difference between 
models was discounting applied only to the cost term of the utility model.  Meyer (2013a) used a 
model that discounted costs and benefits but observed only very small differences in the 
magnitude of the lone utility estimate across discounting types, potentially due to the absence of 
variability in the flow of beneficial services over time. Our models discount costs and benefits, 
and we assume a dynamic flow of benefits over a multi-decadal time scale consistent with 
aquifer change, potentially explaining some of the differences we observe in the WTPs and 
model fit across discounting types.  Since hyperbolic discounters weigh benefits less strongly in 
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the present than exponential discounters, the lower WTP for hyperbolic discounters suggests that 
respondents’ values for groundwater services change over time such that the values are higher in 
the present and lower in the future. 
Another potential driver of the differences we observe between discounting types is the 
flexible mixing distributions.  Flexible mixing allows for individual parameter mass distributions 
that capture the clustering of individual WTP and time preferences and reveal modes of 
preference ‘types’ in the population.  Since the hyperbolic and QH discounting models can 
approximate the exponential discounting13, these discounting models can improve overall fit 
relative to the exponential discounting form with flexible mixing because they can flexibly allow 
some individuals to take on the preferences of an exponential discounter and leave other 
individuals to follow hyperbolic discounting.  This is an advantage when comparing D-LML 
models for evidence of heterogeneity in time preferences. 
Histograms depicting the parameter mass distributions demonstrate the above point 
visually, and they provide more detail about heterogeneity than the estimated standard deviations 
alone.  Figure 2 shows histograms for the preferred QH discounting model.  Evidence suggests 
three modes of time preference, and this multimodality is present with both of the QH time 
parameters: the annual exponential discount rate, r, and the additional discounting parameter, β, 
indicating the degree of present-bias.  The histogram for the discount rate, r, shows a group with 
very small annual discount rates close to zero, a second group taking on rates around 40%, and a 
third group with discount rates larger than 80%.  The histogram for β shows a group of 
individuals with extreme present-bias and a β value around 0.3, another group with β values 
                                                 
13 A β value of 1 approximates exponential discounting for the QH discounting model.  A w value of 0 approximates 
exponential discounting for the HM hyperbolic discounting model.  Harvey hyperbolic discounting approximates 
exponential discounting as u approaches infinity.   
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clustered around 0.5, and a third group with less extreme present-bias and a β value around 0.75.  
Some individuals take on β values close to one, approximating exponential discounting.  Neither 
of the random time parameter histograms resembles a normal distribution.                
 
Figure 2. Estimated distributions of the time parameters and marginal WTPs (QH Model I.d) 
Histograms reveal important details about the marginal WTPs, even for terms in the 
model where the means are not significant.  For example, the mean marginal WTP is not 
significantly different from zero for either of the policy alternatives, yet histograms reveal 
multimodal distributions involving a group of individuals with positive WTP, another group with 
negative WTP, and an ambivalent group with WTP near zero.  For groundwater buffer, the WTP 
distribution is positively skewed, but there is a cluster of individuals with negative WTP.  For 
jobs, WTPs display two modes with the group of smaller WTPs clustered around $6.20 and the 
group of larger WTPs more uniformly distributed across the upper range of the parameter space.  
The histogram for wildlife shows larger densities near the extreme values, suggesting many 
people either value the service highly or else clearly oppose investments to improve wildlife 
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services, but WTPs are distributed more uniformly in the middle values of the parameter space.  
The histogram for water quality is relatively smooth across the parameter space, though it too 
reveals a group with negative WTPs despite the greater density for positive WTP values.  The 
only histogram that resembles a normal distribution is for infrastructure integrity.  The density 
centers on positive WTP values, but a slight negative skew contributes to the lack of significance 
we observe in the mean WTP. 
 Sensitivity to perceived consequentiality and ANA 
 Hypothetical CE studies are subject to known biases resulting from respondents having 
low perceived consequentiality for the study and their choices (Vossler et al., 2012; Zawojska et 
al., 2015) and because respondents often use simplifying heuristics, such as attribute non-
attendance (ANA), that lead to ignoring one or more attributes when making choices (Scarpa et 
al., 2009; Campbell et al., 2012; Mariel et al., 2013; Caputo et al., 2018a).  We examine the 
robustness of the preferred model estimates (QH discounting) to these potentially non-trivial 
biases by estimating models (Table 6) that account for high levels of perceived consequentiality 
(Model II.a) and low levels of stated ANA (Model II.b) through interaction terms.  We assign a 
dummy for high perceived consequentiality to respondents who answered 4 or 5 on the 5-point 
Likert scale when asked about the extent to which they believe their choices and those made by 
other survey respondents are going to receive consideration by Arkansas policy makers.  We 
assign a dummy for low ANA to respondents who always selected “never ignored” when asked 
about their attention to each of the attributes in the choice questions.  To inform the parameter 
supports for the interaction terms in the D-LML, we first estimate models without interaction 
terms using only subsets of the sample who received the dummy assignments, and we compare 
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Table 6.  Simulated maximum likelihood results of the D-LML sensitivity models with QH 
discounting and interactions terms for high levels of perceived consequentiality and low levels of 
ANA 
  
Parameter   II.a (Consequentiality)     II.b (ANA)   
ASC1 (C/T)  1.0382   (0.9486)   0.1347   (0.8941)  
St. deviation (SD)  7.1827* (0.5391)  8.0965* (0.5437)  
ASC2 (SWI)  2.7822   (0.9978)   1.4457   (0.8687)  
SD  9.1822* (0.7166)  9.0047* (0.7607)  
Buffer  0.3135* (0.3860)   0.7871* (0.3955)  
SD  1.9508* (0.2404)   2.1396* (0.2239)  
Quality  0.8622* (0.7350)   3.1976* (0.7857)  
SD  3.5090* (0.3840)   4.0614* (0.4179)  
Jobs  0.6648* (0.0060)   0.6689* (0.0061)  
SD  0.0357* (0.0033)  0.0313* (0.0031)  
Infrastructure  2.3638   (1.1052)   1.9300   (0.9097)  
SD  4.6100* (0.5809)  5.8067* (0.5334)  
Wildlife  0.4690* (0.4162)   0.8170* (0.4456)  
SD  1.8918* (0.2043)   1.9979* (0.2151)  
𝜆𝜆 (scale)  0.1147* (0.0115)   0.1150* (0.0110)  
SD  0.0751* (0.0064) 
 
 0.0717* (0.0062)  
ASC1 (C/T) x Consequential/Attendant  1.2585   (1.1133)  -1.1161   (1.0685)  
St. deviation (SD)  6.0426* (0.5491)   5.3537* (0.5578)  
ASC2 (SWI) x Consequential/Attendant  1.3795   (1.4548)   1.6763   (1.5499)  
SD  8.1966* (0.7252)   9.0855* (0.8703)  
Buffer x Consequential/Attendant  1.2303* (0.4465)   1.7411* (0.4864)  
SD  2.3137* (0.1992)   2.8147* (0.2361)  
Quality x Consequential/Attendant  1.5943* (0.5964)   0.6817* (0.6779)  
SD  4.0947* (0.3166)   3.7750* (0.3293)  
Jobs x Consequential/Attendant  0.6682* (0.0062)   0.6582* (0.0067)  
SD  0.0308* (0.0030)   0.0366* (0.0032)  
Infrastructure x Consequential/Attendant  1.5349   (0.9579)   0.1126   (1.1244)  
SD  5.9849* (0.5030)   5.3268* (0.5227)  
Wildlife x Consequential/Attendant  1.1579* (0.3706)   0.5883* (0.3872)  
SD  1.9871* (0.1805)   2.0491* (0.1893)  
r  0.5614* (0.0428)   0.6265* (0.0456)  
SD  0.1971* (0.0213)  0.2403* (0.0213)  
β  0.6614* (0.0396)   0.6064* (0.0445)  
SD  0.2383* (0.0184)   0.2621* (0.0201)  
r x Consequential/Attendant  0.0330* (0.0461)   0.0203* (0.0495)  
SD  0.2827* (0.0216)   0.2654* (0.0221)  
β x Consequential/Attendant  0.0841   (0.0927)  -0.1682   (0.0896)  
SD  0.4836   (0.0427)   0.4236   (0.0462)  
Log L -3277.8  -3315.1  
AIC 6967.5  7042.3  
N 11655  11655  
Note: WTP values are reported as WTP/10.  Multiply estimates by 10 to obtain dollar amounts. 
Note: Bootstrap Standard Errors given in parentheses were obtained using 250 Bootstrap 
samples.  Bootstrap 95% CIs are shown in Appendix A.  *significant based on 95% CI 
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estimates to the preferred D-LML results (Model I.d).  Then, with informed interaction supports, 
we estimate the D-LML models with dummy interactions.  Results show some sensitivity to 
perceived consequentiality and ANA, but overall interpretation changes little compared to the 
preferred model.  In both the consequentiality and the ANA models, significance of the time 
parameters remains unchanged and the magnitudes are similar, confirming evidence of present-
bias in the population.  The interaction term for β is not significant in either the consequentiality 
model or the ANA model, meaning those with high perceived consequentiality or low ANA 
exhibit no more or less present-bias than others.  Interactions for the exponential discount rate, r, 
though significant, show that discount rates in both cases are only a few percentage points larger. 
As with the preferred model, both sensitivity models show that marginal WTP is positive 
and significant for water quality, groundwater buffer, jobs from agriculture, and wildlife, while 
infrastructure integrity and the C/T and SWI policy alternatives are not significant.  The WTP for 
water quality provision is still largest in both cases.  Interaction terms show that people with high 
perceived consequentiality or low ANA are willing to pay more for each of the valued 
groundwater services, though perceived consequentiality exerts the greater influence.  Those 
with high perceived consequentiality are willing to pay nearly five times as much for 
groundwater buffer, nearly three times as much for water quality and wildlife provision, and 
almost twice as much for jobs than those with low perceived consequentiality.  Based on AIC, 
accounting for high perceived consequentiality improves overall model fit relative to the 
preferred model, but accounting for low ANA does not.  Given these findings, we conclude that 
our preferred model results are robust to the biases of perceived consequentiality and ANA.                                  
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Discussion 
 To learn more about how individuals make intertemporal decisions in non-market 
valuation questions, we estimate random time and preference parameters with flexible mixing 
distributions for long-term groundwater management using a D-LML model.  By allowing 
multimodality and asymmetry in the estimated parameter distributions, flexible mixing reveals 
valuable detail about preference heterogeneity and discounting behavior.  We find three modes 
for the annual exponential discount rate, r, in our preferred QH discounting model: two groups 
with smaller discount rates near 0% and 40%, and a third group with larger discount rates above 
80%.  The β time parameter also reveals three groups of discounting types who exhibit 
increasing levels of present-bias. 
The D-LML enables hyperbolic and QH discounting models to improve fit relative to the 
exponential discounting model by representing heterogeneity in the time parameter such that 
some individuals can take on values that approximate exponential discounting.  Meyer (2013a) 
and Lew (2018) failed to reject the assumption of exponential discounting using normally 
distributed and fixed time parameters.  The only other empirical study to find evidence of 
hyperbolic discounting in stated preferences is Viscusi et al. (2008), who estimated time 
preferences from WTP for water quality improvements realized over varying time horizons.  
Like Lew (2018), we estimate time preferences by varying the payment schedule.  And like 
Meyer (2013a), we model and discount the flows of both costs and benefits over time. 
 Estimated WTPs for marginal groundwater services and alternative groundwater 
management show that people value the provision of water quality, buffer protection against 
long-term drought, provision of habitat that promotes fishing and duck hunting, and jobs from 
irrigated agriculture; and they are willing to pay the most to ensure good water quality.  This 
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finding could suggest that people associate groundwater quality for irrigation with food safety, as 
previous studies find that attributes related to food safety are consistently deemed the most 
important in stated preference studies (e.g., Lusk and Briggeman, 2009; Bazzani et al., 2018).  
On average, respondents do not prefer new investments for surface water infrastructure or a 
groundwater permits marketplace over the SQ management alternative.  However, flexible 
distributions reveal groups of individuals who possess high values for both new alternatives.  
Mean WTP is consistently smaller under hyperbolic discounting assumptions.  This suggests that 
respondents’ values for groundwater services change over time such that the values are higher in 
the present, when hyperbolic discounters weigh benefits less strongly than exponential 
discounters, and lower in the future. 
 Our findings and those from other stated preference studies estimating time preferences 
contribute to discussion about the appropriate application of discounting in benefit-cost analyses 
for non-market goods.  Like most empirical studies, we estimate discount rates much larger than 
those commonly used in policy analysis.  Compared to Meyer (2013a), who estimated an annual 
exponential discount rate of 12.8% using variation in the benefits horizon, we estimate much 
higher rates of discounting, including a mean discount rate of 73.7% under exponential 
discounting.  Our flexible time parameter shows groups of individuals with smaller discount 
rates and compares more similarly with CV studies by Kovacs and Larson (2008) and Bond et al. 
(2009), who estimated exponential discount rates under varying payment horizons that range 
from about 20% to as much as 70%.  Lew (2018) estimated a fixed exponential discount rate of 
122%, larger even than the upper extreme of the finite D-LML support space that fit our data 
best. 
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 To address concerns that implicit discount rates are implausibly high and disconnected 
from actual discount rates due to unserious consideration of the survey instrument or choice 
attributes (see Myers et al., 2017), we estimate sensitivity models that account for high levels of 
perceived consequentiality and low levels of stated ANA.  We find that full attendance to the 
choice attributes does not reduce discount rates.  Instead, we observe a slightly larger exponential 
discount rate under full attendance and no difference in terms of the degree of present-bias.  
Accounting for ANA does not improve model fit.  Accounting for perceived consequentiality 
does improve model fit, but high levels of perceived consequentiality also lead to slightly larger 
exponential discount rates and no difference in present-bias.  Future research is might examine 
the causes for high empirical discount rates.     
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III. How Narrative Framing about Climate Change Impacts Preferences for Long-Term 
Groundwater Management  
Co-authors: Kent Kovacs and Rodolfo Nayga Jr. 
 Issue framing is a communication strategy that can help individuals form opinions and 
process information (e.g., Chong 1993, Druckman 2004, Berinsky and Kinder 2006).  Policy 
elites, including the media, employ framing using narrative structures and content to 
communicate policy relevant information and draw attention to particular dimensions within a 
message (Chong and Druckman 2007, Jones and McBeth 2010, Shanahan et al. 2011b).  The 
messages within competing frames shape the debate surrounding a political controversy.  For 
instance, research shows that narrative framing applied to climate change policy that focuses on 
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions influences the way individuals group terms and 
phrases that are prevalent in climate change debates (Jones and Song 2014).  However, it is yet 
unclear whether the systematic effects of framing on thought patterns still apply to stated policy 
preferences.  Furthermore, narrative frames about climate change might not have the same 
influence when applied to policies that address climate change’s consequences rather than its 
causes.  
Public policy necessary to combat climate change goes beyond GHG reductions and must 
include mitigation of problematic environmental conditions unrelated to the controversial causes 
of climate change.  New strategies, for instance, are necessary for the long-term management of 
water resources in order to mitigate the effects of worsening drought caused by climate change 
(Schaible and Aillery 2017).  The need for effective policies to address a range of climate change 
consequences makes it important to better understand framing effects in these contexts.  In the 
case of managing water resources, the prevalence of collaborative governance (e.g., Lubell et al. 
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2002, Lubell 2005, Leach and Sabatier 2005, Koontz and Newig 2014) could mean that framing 
effects are especially critical for effectively communicating policy information, gaining support, 
and changing behaviour.  Formalization of the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) (Jones and 
McBeth 2010, Shanahan et al. 2011a, McBeth et al. 2014) has facilitated systematic inquiry into 
the role of narrative framing in public policy.  Narrative analysis has demonstrated an iterative 
process through which different environmental narratives become problematized reflections of 
one another as each attempts to dictate governance, leading to polarization within a policy sub-
system (Warner 2019).  The desire to avoid this process makes understanding systematic 
narrative influences important.  
Cultural cognition helps generally to explain public disagreement about the significance 
of empirical evidence (Kahan et al. 2006, Kahan et al. 2011).  The motivated-reasoning model 
suggests that individuals credit evidence that aligns with one’s worldview while dismissing that 
which challenges held values (e.g., Kunda 1990, Lodge and Taber 2005, Taber and Lodge 2006).  
Cultural Theory (e.g., Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, Thompson et al. 1990) – a theory about the 
cultural cognition of risk perception – posits that individuals largely fall into four typologies of 
cultural cognition (individualist, hierarchical, egalitarian, and fatalist) and that individuals form 
perceptions that reinforce these worldviews.  For example, individuals with relatively 
individualistic worldviews will be sceptical of environmental risks because accepting the need to 
restrict commerce and industry in order to mitigate environmental risk is incongruent with their 
held values.  In contrast, these types of policy interventions are congruent with egalitarian views 
about the negative impact of commerce and industry, so egalitarians will perceive greater 
degrees of environmental risk.  Jones and McBeth (2010) suggested that populating structurally 
defined narrative components such as characters using Cultural Theory-derived content can 
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ensure that researchers imbue structural elements with generalizable meaning.  Jones and Song 
(2014) used Cultural Theory to anchor the content of stories to a robust theory of human belief 
systems that moderates the problem of narrative relativity (Derrida 1981, Dodge et al. 2005), and 
this facilitated hypothesis tests about framing effects related to narrative congruence and 
incongruence with cultural typologies.  They generally found that when respondents were 
exposed to culturally congruent stories, organizational patterns identified by cluster analysis 
were significantly more likely to mirror the story.  Few studies, however, investigate whether 
similar framing effects occur in the formation of policy preferences, and fewer use narrative 
forms and content that facilitate generalizable inference (e.g., McMorris et al., 2018; Zanocco et 
al., 2018). 
We elicit preferences for social and environmental groundwater services as well as long-
term groundwater management policies in the Lower Mississippi River Basin (LMRB) using a 
Choice Experiment (CE) survey conducted in Arkansas.  The Mississippi River Valley Alluvial 
Aquifer (MRVA) serves as the critical water supply for irrigated agriculture in the LMRB, and 
current rates of groundwater withdrawal from the MRVA are unsustainable (Konikow 2015).  
Climate change threatens to accelerate groundwater shortages because more frequent and intense 
droughts (e.g., Rosenberg et al. 1999, 2000, Logan et al. 2010) will diminish natural recharge 
and make users more reliant on groundwater (e.g., Whittemore et al. 2015, Meixner et al. 2016).  
Koundouri et al. (2012) estimated the value of scientific information about climate change in 
regard to groundwater but did not investigate systematic influences on groundwater values. Their 
approach obscures the ways that individual perceptions mediate scientific information (e.g., Lord 
et al. 1979, Slovic et al. 1991, Slovic 2000, Kahan et al. 2009, Kahan et al. 2011).  We estimate 
preferences from the elicited stated choice data in Arkansas using mixed logit models (e.g., 
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Revelt and Train 1998), and we test for systematic influences of framing by exposing some 
participants to a structuralist, culturally-biased (individualistic) narrative about climate change.  
We do this by randomly assigning respondents to a control group not exposed to the cultural 
narrative and to a treated group exposed to the cultural narrative.  We identify groundwater 
services that appeal to individualists such as those for commerce and industry and services that 
appeal to non-individualists such as water quality and wildlife.  We then test hypotheses about 
(in)congruence using sub-sample analysis dictated by the respondents’ cultural type.   
Two other studies investigate whether systematic framing effects occur in the formation 
of policy preferences.  Zanocco et al. (2018) used a structuralist narrative to measure cultural 
influences related to hydraulic fracturing preferences but did not use a choice context 
comparable to voting where individuals must make choices among limited options that involve 
important tradeoffs.  McMorris et al. (2018) measured hydraulic fracturing preferences and 
narrative responses employing survey measures modeled in the choice context of a vote.  Using a 
CE to measure policy preferences and narrative influence, we contribute relevant new findings to 
this line of literature because CE data provide direct evidence about heterogeneity in preferences 
related to the different attributes of a policy alternative while forcing respondents to make 
choices involving important tradeoffs between those attributes.  Furthermore, ours is the first 
study to examine the influence of narrative frames on policy preferences for mitigating long-term 
consequences of climate change, specifically, long-term groundwater depletion.   
The following section describes the cultural narrative used in the experiment within the 
context of Cultural Theory and structuralist (e.g., Genette 1983, Shanahan et al. 2011a) 
understandings about narrative form and content.  We then detail our experimental design and 
data collection, and we conclude with results and discussion. 
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Methods 
 Cultural narrative about climate change 
 As previously mentioned, we randomly assigned respondents to two groups: a control 
group without exposure to the narrative and a treated group that was provided the narrative frame 
about climate change and groundwater before the choice questions. We derived the content of 
our narrative using Cultural Theory – developed by Mary Douglas (1974) and Aaron Wildavsky 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1982) – which measures belief systems along two dimensions known as 
grid and group (Thompson et al. 1990).  The group dimension measures preferred levels of group 
interaction, while grid measures the degree to which these groups constrain beliefs and behaviour 
(Thompson et al. 1990).  Oriented orthogonally, these dimensions define four cultural types 
possessing distinct views about nature.  Hierarchs (high grid, high group) see nature as 
precariously balanced and requiring skilled managers and experts to maintain stability and avoid 
calamity.  Individualists (low grid, low group) view nature as extremely resilient and able to 
return to equilibrium as long as events run their natural course.  Egalitarians (low grid, high 
group) view nature as dangerously fragile and susceptible to human activities that could destroy 
the environment if not undertaken with caution.  Finally, fatalists (high grid, low group) see 
nature as a capricious and random thing and believe that good and bad things will happen no 
matter what they do (Jones and Song 2014). 
 Previous research has identified prevalent cultural stories in public discourse that relate to 
climate change and unique Cultural Theory types (Ney and Thompson 2000, Verweij et al. 
2006).  Jones and Song (2014) used these stories to construct experimental treatments for 
egalitarian, hierarchical, and individualistic cultural narratives.  They described three Cultural 
Theory stories: Profligacy: An Egalitarian Story, Lack of Global Planning: A Hierarchical Story, 
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and Business as Usual: An Individualistic Story.  Each narrative followed the form specified in 
the NPF (Jones and McBeth 2010), with a setting, plot, characters, and a policy solution (moral).  
They populated these structural elements with content from the three Cultural Theory stories.  
The fatalistic narrative frame has largely been excluded from past studies of CT on the grounds 
that “...the fatalistic solidarity does not motivate people to participate consistently in public 
debates” (Verweij et al., 2006: 822, as cited in Jones and Song 2014).  This exclusion from past 
studies makes it difficult to assess congruence and incongruence for the fatalist group.  In line 
with previous studies, we omit the fatalist group from our analysis of CT variants.  We use the 
individualistic story from Jones and Song (2014) as a model for the narrative frame in our CE 
survey.   
In the individualistic story, the heroic characters are groups like the Cato Institute (a 
Libertarian think tank) and Wall Street Journal (a business-focused news publication) because 
they reflect principles consistent with individual liberty and free-market economics.  The 
sentiment is that naïve idealists and self-interested government representatives have fabricated 
the issue of climate change.  Furthermore, if individualists must concede that climate change is a 
problem, then the only solution would be to allow market forces to move forward, believing that 
if individuals compete and innovate, new technologies will allow for adaptation.  The moral of 
the individualistic story is that markets should operate with limited interference.  Therefore, 
individualists are likely to be more sympathetic to market-oriented solutions.   
 The individualistic narrative frame used in our CE survey contains five paragraphs (see 
Appendix for the complete narrative text).  The first paragraph establishes the setting, describing 
that groundwater levels are declining, and that resource depletion threatens current economic and 
environmental services supported by groundwater.  It describes the likelihood for more frequent 
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and severe drought due to climate change that threatens to make the problem worse.  The second 
paragraph establishes a negative (from an individualistic perspective) plot and characters that 
comport with the egalitarian cultural type and casts their proposed policy solutions as destructive 
and hindering progress toward sustainable groundwater management.  The third paragraph 
counters the second and introduces an individualistic plot about groundwater and climate change 
wherein radical environmental types are using facts about groundwater scarcity and climate 
change to push a destructive agenda.  This paragraph argues that a policy solution involving the 
trade of marketable groundwater extraction permits is the best and most efficient way to generate 
groundwater conservation because it relies on free competition.  Heroic (from an individualistic 
perspective) characters such as the Cato Institute are said to advocate this solution.   
The fourth paragraph describes the policy solution as a groundwater permits market, 
including the nature of tradeable pumping rights and the competition to reduce pumping.  This 
describes the market-oriented policy solution commonly referred to as Cap-and-Trade (C/T).  
With C/T, the amount of water pumped from an aquifer is set according to the guidelines on 
permits available to groundwater users who can only pump if they have a permit.  Users are free 
to buy and sell permits, and competition ensures that the allowable groundwater pumping is 
efficiently allocated via the free market.  The cap component of C/T may frustrate the 
individualist, but the trading element should appeal to the individualist type.  The fifth paragraph 
summarizes the individualistic rationale and re-emphasizes support for the market-based policy 
solution. 
The motivated-reasoning model suggests predictable responses to our narrative frame 
stimulus.  Narratives draw attention to specific structures (e.g., characters and morals) which we 
imbue with meaning from Cultural Theory.  Elements within these structures generate cultural 
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identifications (e.g., affect from hero characters) that allow individuals to quickly evaluate 
congruence or incongruence (Jones and Song 2014).  Like Jones and Song (2014), we expect to 
observe two situations in our experiment.  First, when an individualist encounters the 
individualistic narrative frame that is congruent to their held values, we predict these respondents 
will filter the story favourably and allow its congruent content to inform their groundwater and 
policy preferences.  In particular, we predict that individualists who encounter our narrative 
frame will have a higher preference for a market-based groundwater policy alternative (Table 1).  
On the other hand, when other Cultural Theory types encounter the incongruent individualistic 
narrative frame, we predict these respondents will either: 1) ignore the story, or 2) assimilate the 
information to strengthen their pre-existing beliefs and preferences rather than those supported in 
the narrative.  We expect that egalitarians and hierarchs will have less preference for a market-
based policy alternative and could demonstrate greater preference for an alternative policy, such 
as the more egalitarian policy alternative characterized by subsidized surface-water infrastructure 
(SWI) projects.  The SWI alternative is potentially egalitarian because an egalitarian perspective 
on the groundwater overdraft problem is that individuals have the tendency to overconsume non-
renewable, common-pool resources.  An egalitarian solution is then to address groundwater 
overdraft by replacing society’s use of a non-renewable resource with a more renewable resource 
such as surface water. 
We predict in the case of marginal preferences for groundwater services that the framing 
effect among individualists will reflect increased preference for services related to commerce and 
industry (e.g., jobs from irrigated agriculture) and potentially lower preference for other social 
and environmental services (Table 2).  Non-individualists, conversely, are likely to respond to 
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the individualistic narrative elements with diminished preference for commerce-related services 
and greater preference for the other social and environmental services. 
Table 1.  Predicted Influence of the Individualist Narrative Frame on Policy Preferences 
CT Variant Hypothesis – Narrative Influence 
Egalitarian No change or lower preference for market-based alternative.  
No change or greater preference for subsidized surface water 
infrastructure alternative  
Hierarch No change or lower preference for market-based alternative. 
No change or greater preference for subsidized surface water 
infrastructure alternative 
Individualist Greater preference for market-based alternative. 
No change or lower preference for subsidized surface water 
infrastructure alternative 
 
Table 2.  Predicted Influence of the Individualist Narrative Frame on Marginal Groundwater 
Preferences 
  
CT Variant Hypothesis – Narrative Influence 
Egalitarian No change or lower preference for groundwater services related to 
commerce and industry (jobs from agriculture).   
No change or greater preference for social and environmental services 
(buffer, water quality, wildlife habitat, infrastructure integrity). 
Hierarch No change or lower preference for groundwater services related to 
commerce and industry (jobs from agriculture).   
No change or greater preference for social and environmental services 
(buffer, water quality, wildlife habitat, infrastructure integrity). 
Individualist Greater preference for groundwater services related to commerce and 
industry: jobs from agriculture. 
No change or lower preference for social and environmental services 
(buffer, water quality, wildlife habitat, infrastructure integrity) 
 
 Choice experiment design 
 We chose to elicit groundwater preferences of Arkansas residents by conducting a CE 
survey involving outcomes of the Mississippi River Valley Alluvial Aquifer (MRVA) in the 
LMRB, specifically, in the Delta region of eastern Arkansas.  Respondents choose among three 
alternatives for groundwater management, including a surface water infrastructure (SWI) 
alternative, a cap-and-trade (C/T) alternative, and a status quo (SQ) alternative involving no 
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change to current MRVA groundwater management in Arkansas.  Information about each 
alternative is available to survey respondents, and each respondent must successfully answer 
comprehension questions about each alternative before advancing in the survey. 
 We first conducted a focus group to help determine the groundwater service attributes 
most appropriate for the CE design.  This feedback, together with existing conceptual 
frameworks for groundwater valuation (NRC 1997), guided the selection of the CE attributes.  
We identified five main groundwater services, or attributes.  These are water quality for irrigated 
agriculture, the provision of jobs in the agricultural economy, the provision of habitat for 
maintaining wildlife, especially fish and waterfowl for local tourism, the avoidance of 
subsidence and its associated infrastructure costs, and the certainty of adequate water supply in 
case of drought (buffer).   
Attribute levels indicate MRVA outcomes for the year 2050 and appear in terms of a 
percentage of current levels, so that 100% indicates no change from current levels.  We use 
percentage values in order to moderate the difficulty of comparing alternatives across multiple 
attributes. Johnston et al. (2016) use this practice in a CE with three alternatives and six 
environmental attributes.  To construct a groundwater scenario with realistic long-term 
dynamics, attribute levels presented for each alternative represent projections for the year 2050, 
and levels for the SQ alternative capture the evolving state of groundwater resources if no policy 
change occurs.  We rely on existing hydrologic (Clark et al. 2013) and economic (Kovacs et al. 
2015) simulation models to help in setting realistic attribute levels for the SQ alternative.  We 
include a cost attribute using an increase to state income taxes for the household as the payment 
mechanism.  For the purposes of a complementary study, a split-sample design varied the timing, 
duration, and magnitude of expenses associated with the cost attribute (details available on the 
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American Economic Association’s registry for randomized controlled trials, RCT ID: 
AEARCTR-0003247).  We simplify modeling by using present-value costs computed with the 
results of a Convex Time Budget (CTB) questionnaire employed in the survey to allow for 
estimating time preferences (i.e., discount rate).  See Andreoni et al. (2015) for a description of 
the CTB approach.  The attributes and levels in our CE are in Table 3.   
We used a three-stage sequential Bayesian approach to construct the experimental design 
(Scarpa et al. 2007, Bliemer et al. 2008, Scarpa and Rose 2008).  Using the software Ngene and 
uninformative priors, we constructed an efficient design for use in a pilot survey (Bliemer et al. 
2008).  Parameter priors from the pilot study (n=203) then updated a Bayesian efficient design 
(Scarpa and Rose 2008).  We selected a design with 30 choice sets to achieve attribute level 
balance and grouped these into blocks to reduce the number of choice sets each respondent must 
complete.  With six block groups, respondents answer five choice sets each.  The levels for the 
SQ alternative, including no additional household cost, are constant throughout the experimental 
design.  Figure 1 shows an example of a choice set. 
Table 3. Choice Experiment attribute definitions and levels 
Attribute Definition Levelsa,b 
Buffer Quantity The percentage of current acres with 
adequate groundwater for 5 consecutive 
drought years 
25%, 40%, 55%, 70% 
Water Quality The percentage of current acres with 
adequate groundwater quality for 
irrigation 
75%, 80%, 85%, 90% 
Jobs from Irrigated Agriculture The percentage of current (120,000) 
jobs 
80%, 90%, 100%, 110% 
Wildlife Diversity and 
Abundance 
The percentage of current wildlife 
diversity and abundance 
75%, 80%, 85%, 90% 
Infrastructure Integrity The percentage of current infrastructure 
integrity 
75%, 80%, 85%, 90% 
Cost to Household (lump) The one-time dollar increase in state 
income taxes 
$0, $30, $90, $150, $210, $270 
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Table 3. (Cont.) 
Attribute Definition Levelsa,b 
Cost to Household (perpetual) The permanent dollar increase in state 
income taxes 
$0, $12, $24, $36, $48, $60 
a The status quo levels are indicated in bold. 
b Levels indicate outcomes for the year 2050 and 100% indicates no change from current levels. 
  
 
 
Figure 1.  Example choice task 
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 Choice modeling 
 To model our choice data the utility function for each choice alternative is strictly 
additive, and the probability that a respondent chooses a particular alternative is a function of the 
alternative’s attributes and levels.  A multinomial logit (MNL) specification (McFadden 1974) 
models this utility for our data involving three alternatives and six attributes, but the MNL’s 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property restrictively assumes independence 
between choice tasks.  This is not a realistic assumption for our data.  To account for the panel 
structure of our data and allow attribute correlation within an unobserved portion of utility across 
alternatives and choice situations, we estimate mixed logit models with random parameters, 
allowing preferences to vary across individuals (e.g., Revelt and Train 1998, Hensher and 
Greene 2003).  Results of an MNL model using the pooled data set are included in Appendix B 
and were used as starting values for the simulated maximum likelihood estimations of the mixed 
logit models.  Goodness-of-fit statistics confirm that mixed logit is the preferred model.  In 
estimating random parameters, we model each as a distribution of individual preference 
coefficients with a mean and standard deviation and estimate standard errors for each. 
To analyse the discrete choice data using mixed logit, let the utility for an individual n for 
alternative j in choice situation t be given by 
𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥′𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 + 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, 
 where 𝑥𝑥′𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 represents a vector of alternative-specific groundwater service attribute levels 
including benefits and costs, 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 represents a vector of coefficients that are fixed for an individual 
across choice situations but vary across individuals, and 𝜀𝜀𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is distributed i.i.d. extreme value 
type I.   
(11) 
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Individual n chooses alternative i in choice situation t if 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 >  𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡  ∀𝑚𝑚 ≠ 𝑖𝑖.  
Conditional on 𝛽𝛽, this probability is the standard logit formula 
𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛) =  
exp�𝑥𝑥′𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛�
∑ exp�𝑥𝑥′𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛�
𝐽𝐽
𝑖𝑖=1
. 
 The conditional probability that individual n chooses a sequence of alternatives (𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛1, 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛2, … , 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑇𝑇) 
over T choice situations is 
𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛(𝛽𝛽) =  ∏ �
exp�𝑥𝑥′𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛�
∑ exp�𝑥𝑥′𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛�
𝐽𝐽
𝑖𝑖=1
�𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 . 
 We integrate out over all values of 𝛽𝛽 to get the unconditional choice probability, 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 =  �𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛(𝛽𝛽)𝑖𝑖(𝛽𝛽)𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽. 
The log-likelihood function is then, 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽) =  � ln(𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛(𝛽𝛽)𝑖𝑖(𝛽𝛽)𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽).
𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=1
 
Given that there is no closed form of 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽), the probabilities are approximated through 
simulation.  The simulated log-likelihood function is defined as 
𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽) = � ln�1𝑅𝑅� �� �
exp(𝑥𝑥′𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻)
∑ exp�𝑥𝑥′𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻�
𝐽𝐽
𝑖𝑖=1
�
𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=1
�
𝑅𝑅
𝐻𝐻=1
�
𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=1
, 
where 𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻 are random draws from the density 𝑖𝑖(𝛽𝛽), and R is the number of draws. 
 We conduct this choice modeling analysis to provide evidence toward two primary 
research objectives.  First, we ask whether a climate change policy narrative influences cognition 
related to policies that seek to mitigate environmental consequences of climate change rather 
than alleviate its controversial human causes.  To serve this purpose we selected groundwater 
policies as the subject of the environmental CE.  Second, we ask whether narrative framing 
effects are evident with respect to policy preferences (see Table 1) and groundwater service 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
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preferences (see Table 2) and whether these effects manifest in a systematic and predictable way.  
Specifically, we seek evidence of narrative (in)congruence informed by the motivated-reasoning 
model and CT.  In our CE, we record preferences for two distinct groundwater policies as well as 
five groundwater service attributes to enrich evidence about systematic effects. 
 To facilitate these objectives and formal hypothesis testing, we present two specifications 
of the mixed logit: one that includes only main effects and no assumed interactions and another 
that includes interaction effects for the individualist cultural narrative.  In all models, we include 
alternative-specific constants (ASCs) for the two policy alternatives to capture policy preferences 
relative to the SQ option.  In the first specification we designate all non-price parameters to be 
random with a normal distribution.  A fixed price parameter permits computation of willingness-
to-pay (WTP) while avoiding extreme tails in the WTP distributions that result when dividing 
one normal distribution by another.  In the specification with interactions, only the main effects 
are normally distributed random parameters.  Models are estimated in R using the GMNL 
package and simulated maximum likelihood with 500 pseudo-random draws (Sarrias and 
Daziano 2017). 
Data 
Our CE survey elicits preferences for long-term groundwater management policies 
implemented at the state level.  We concentrate on sampling voting-aged residents of Arkansas, 
where the dominant portion of the MRVA is located and the most groundwater use occurs.  
Between August 27th and October 17th of 2018, we administered the CE survey using the survey 
research firm, Qualtrics.  In total, 1,966 adult residents of Arkansas voluntarily accessed the 
internet-based survey from proprietary research panels and other internet sources.  We designed 
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the survey to be compatible with both traditional and mobile internet platforms.  Individuals 
received a financial incentive for participating in the survey. 
Growing literatures suggest that stated preference survey designs should account for 
known biases in stated preferences that can occur due to low perceived consequentiality (e.g., 
Vossler et al. 2012, Vossler and Watson 2013, Zawojska et al. 2015) and hypothetical bias (e.g., 
List and Gallet 2001, Lusk and Schroeder 2004).  We use recommended best practices intended 
to potentially reduce these known biases.  By including text to enhance the perceived 
consequentiality of survey responses with respect to potential policy outcomes, field experiments 
show that respondents put more effort into providing truthful responses (Vossler et al. 2012, 
Zawojska et al. 2015).  A “cheap talk” script that reminds respondents about the constraints of 
their household budget can be an effective means to reduce hypothetical bias (Cummings and 
Taylor 1999).  We employ these design elements to limit bias in our stated preference data. 
The survey questionnaire begins with a brief overview and questions to collect 
information about topic familiarity and perceptions about water resources, environment, and 
society.  Using language to augment the perceived consequentiality of the study (Vossler et al. 
2012), respondents read that their groundwater management preferences from the survey will be 
shared with the Arkansas Natural Resources Commission and other stakeholders and might 
affect how Arkansas actually manages its groundwater resources.  Specifically, respondents read 
that their responses could be used as advice on whether to implement new groundwater 
management policies, and that the likelihood that a particular alternative occurs could increase 
with the number of “yes” votes for that alternative.  Respondents also read a bulleted list of 
information discussing aquifers, socio-environmental services from the MRVA, and MRVA 
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groundwater availability and management.  This section includes a map depicting the current 
depth to MRVA groundwater across eastern Arkansas. 
Before completing the choice sets for the CE, respondents read that they will make a 
series of hypothetical voting decisions between two policy alternatives for managing 
groundwater resources and a SQ option representing no change to groundwater management 
policy.  The respondents also see detailed descriptions about the SQ, SWI, and C/T alternatives.  
Instructions that follow describe the attributes and the payment mechanism in the choice sets.  
Regarding attribute levels, respondents read that the rate of decline (or change) from the current 
(100%) levels to the 2050 levels is steady over the approximately 30-year time horizon, and the 
levels in 2050 then remain constant into the future.  This language is to minimize confounding 
factors by establishing a common reference point for all respondents.  Each must confirm that 
they understand the timing of the payment mechanism, read the consequentiality language again, 
and view an example choice set.  In addition, just prior to beginning the actual choice sets, we 
employ a “cheap talk” script to reduce hypothetical bias (Cummings and Taylor 1999), and 
respondents have the option to review the detailed descriptions about the groundwater 
management alternatives again. 
We randomize the assignment of question blocks and the order in which the choice sets 
appear in each block.  Above each choice set is a reminder that socio-environmental attribute 
levels decline steadily and then remain constant into the future.  The levels of the SQ alternative 
are fixed, so we place it always in the left most column of the choice set table to make it easy for 
respondents to compare alternatives across multiple sets.  However, we randomize the placement 
of the columns for the SWI and C/T alternatives to avoid any ordering effects.  Respondents 
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assigned to the treatment group see an individualist cultural narrative about climate change 
following the bulleted groundwater information section of the survey.   
Qualtrics filters responses for quality to remove duplicates from a single individual or 
any observation with a total response time less than one-third the median total response time.  
Incomplete responses are dropped from the analysis, leaving 1,946 usable survey responses and 
data for 29,190 choice occasions (each person sees five choice sets, and each choice set includes 
three choice occasions because there are three alternatives for each choice set).  Of these, 8,790 
choice occasions come from the 586 individuals in the treatment group who see an individualist 
cultural narrative about climate change, while 20,400 choice occasions come from the 1,360 
individuals assigned to the control group.  We collected a larger control sample for the purposes 
of a complementary study. 
The sample overall is similar to the target population of Arkansas residents, sharing 
characteristics for median income and unemployment rate while being slightly older (median age 
43 compared to 38), more female (65.6% to 51.5%), and more educated (31.7% with bachelor’s 
degree to 23.4%) (US Census Bureau 2018).  Statistics on voters and registered voters in the US 
suggest that the voting electorate shares these same biases relative to the general population (File 
2018), supplying added confidence in the validity of the stated policy preferences.  We find 
balance in observable demographic characteristics between groups of respondents who do and do 
not receive the narrative treatment using unpaired t-tests (means) and Chi-squared tests 
(proportions) (see Table 4).  Though the difference in age is significant at the 10% level, a mean 
age difference of less than two years is not likely to influence the results of our CE. 
Table 4. Treatment sample balance 
Characteristic No Narrative Narrative Treatment t, χ² p-value 
N 1360 586   
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Table 4. (Cont.) 
Characteristic No Narrative Narrative Treatment t, χ² p-value 
Age, mean 44.1 45.4 1.67 .095 
Household size, mean 2.82 2.74 -1.32 .189 
Household income   2.85 .415 
   $0 - $39,999 46.0% 49.0%   
   $40,000 - $69,999 15.6% 13.0%   
   $70,000 - $99,999 23.2% 23.5%   
   $100,000+ 15.2% 14.5%   
Female 66.0% 64.5% .357 .550 
Education   2.75 .253 
   High school or less 27.9% 28.3%   
   Some college 41.4% 37.7%   
   College graduate 30.7% 34.0%   
Married 56.4% 53.6% 1.20 .273 
Unemployed 4.41%  6.14%  2.26  .133 
 
Addressing our research questions requires knowledge about each respondent’s cultural 
type.  We measure cultural type using twelve CT questions (see Appendix B) – three questions 
for each cultural type: individualist, egalitarian, hierarch, and fatalist (e.g., Dake 1991, 1992, 
Wildavsky and Dake 1990, Herron and Jenkins-Smith 2006, Jones and Song 2014) – which were 
administered prior to the choice sets and randomized.  Respondents answer each CT question by 
placing themselves on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is strongly disagree and 7 is strongly agree.  
Factor analysis of the indicators shows that they load on four unique latent dimensions 
corresponding to each of the cultural types (see Appendix).  We generate factor scores for each 
cultural type, and the type with the highest factor score is that respondent’s cultural type.  Table 
5 summarizes the collected responses by cultural type and the presence or absence of narrative 
treatment exposure.  A Chi-squared test shows no difference between treatment groups in the 
proportional distribution of CT types (p = 0.835).  The following section describes the results of 
the choice modeling analysis. 
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Table 5.  Summary of CT type frequencies (proportions) by treatment 
CT Type No Narrative Narrative Treatment 
Egalitarian 311 (23%) 135 (23%) 
Hierarch 327 (24%) 186 (32%) 
Individualist 308 (23%) 130 (22%) 
Fatalist 414 (30%) 135 (23%) 
Total 1360 (100%) 586 (100%) 
Note: Chi-squared test shows no difference between treatment group proportions (p = .835)       
Results 
 Specification I shown in Table 6 presents mixed logit results including only main effects 
and no assumed interactions.  Model I.a shows the results from the pooled data set.  We also 
estimate models using subsets defined by CT type.  Models I.b (egalitarian), I.c (hierarch), and 
I.d (individualist) show the results of sub-sample models for each CT type (sans fatalist).  Table 
7 presents the models for Specification II where we include interaction effects for the 
individualist cultural narrative.  For each of the models (a, b, c, and d), we test the hypothesis 
that preferences for those exposed to the individualist narrative treatment are equal to 
preferences for those not exposed (H0: 𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 −  𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁−𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 0).  We compute 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests between the nested models of specification I and specification II 
(Table 8). 
We reject the null hypothesis for the pooled models (I.a and II.a) at the 10% level and 
conclude that specification II is the preferred model.  Results for Model II.a indicate significant 
and positive mean preferences among the Arkansas population for the SWI policy alternative 
(ASC2) as well as for groundwater services associated with buffer value, water quality, jobs 
from agriculture, and infrastructure integrity.  The parameter for cost is significant and negative, 
as theory predicts.  Mean preference for the C/T policy alternative (ASC1) is not significantly 
different from zero.  The standard deviation for each of the random parameters is significant, 
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suggesting there is considerable variability in the population with respect to groundwater policy 
preferences.  Though Model II.a is the preferred pooled model, its interaction terms do not 
provide evidence of significant narrative influence on preferences.  Accounting for the narrative 
interaction significantly improves model fit despite the lack of evident effect in the interaction 
terms.  In particular, preference for Wildlife services is no longer significant, suggesting that the 
positive preference for Wildlife services indicated in Model I.a could be capturing unaccounted 
for narrative influence, to some degree.  With substantial variability in preferences across the 
population and no clear predicted effect, the pooled model may obscure potentially competing 
influences (e.g., congruence and incongruence) of the individualist cultural policy narrative 
exerted upon different cultural types.   
By segmenting the population according to CT type, we can test for the influences of 
cultural cognition in response to the individualist narrative frame.  The first prediction is that 
individualist cultural types will exhibit an influence of cultural congruence with the narrative that 
aligns to their own worldview, strengthening related preferences and perhaps weakening others.  
Based upon the LR test for the Individualist models (I.d and II.d) we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis at any reasonable confidence level and cannot conclude that specification II is 
preferred over specification I.  As with the pooled data, Individualists exhibit no evidence of 
narrative influence and consequently no evidence of cultural congruence.  Results of Model I.d 
indicate that Individualists show no preference for either policy alternative and value only water 
quality among the groundwater service attributes.  Preferences vary significantly even among 
Individualist cultural types. 
The second prediction is that non-individualist cultural types will exhibit the influence of 
cultural incongruence in response to the individualist cultural narrative.  Results of the LR tests 
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Table 6.  Results of mixed logit: specification I 
Parameter   I.a (pooled)     I.b (egalitarian)     I.c (hierarch)     I.d (individualist)   
ASC1 (C/T)  0.0015      (0.1813)   1.1714*** (0.3977)  -0.0677      (0.4190)  -0.5770      (0.4850)  
Standard 
deviation 
(SD) 
 3.1648*** (0.2449)  3.2741*** (0.6194)  3.5999*** (0.6566)  4.4548*** (0.6824) 
ASC2 (SWI)  0.3887**   (0.1766)   1.6696*** (0.3863)   0.3853      (0.4178)  -0.0526      (0.4673)  
SD  2.9430*** (0.2682)  2.9235*** (0.6283)  3.5294*** (0.6185)  4.2723*** (0.6970) 
Buffer  0.0079*** (0.0019)   0.0061      (0.0042)   0.0123*** (0.0044)   0.0055      (0.0049)  
SD  0.0113*** (0.0033)  0.0241*** (0.0053)  0.0203*     (0.0105)  0.0191*** (0.0069) 
Quality  0.0254*** (0.0056)   0.0187      (0.0121)   0.0222*     (0.0124)   0.0515*** (0.0169)  
SD  0.0551*** (0.0111)  0.0813*** (0.0212)  0.0390*     (0.0219)  0.1544*** (0.0232) 
Jobs  0.0089*** (0.0031)   0.0016      (0.0065)   0.0130*     (0.0072)   0.0068      (0.0082)  
SD  0.0153**   (0.0075)  0.0331*** (0.0106)  0.0334*     (0.0188)  0.0556*** (0.0113) 
Infrastructure  0.0136*** (0.0049)   0.0244**   (0.0098)   0.0099      (0.0113)   0.0190      (0.0129)  
SD  0.0559*** (0.0086)  0.0524*** (0.0159)  0.0679*** (0.0173)  0.0703*** (0.0231) 
Wildlife  0.0095**   (0.0048)   0.0071      (0.0099)   0.0047      (0.0111)   0.0138      (0.0130)  
SD  0.0373*** (0.0106)  0.0626*** (0.0190)  0.0408*** (0.0155)  0.0624**   (0.0286) 
Cost -0.0056*** (0.0003)   -0.0069*** (0.0008)   -0.0074*** (0.0008)   -0.0089*** (0.0010)   
Log L -8835.6  -1940.2  -1972.0  -1886.8  
N 29190  6690  7695  6570  
AIC 17743.2   3952.4   4016.0   3845.6   
Note: Standard Errors are given in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%  
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Table 7.  Results of mixed logit with interactions for narrative treatment exposure: specification II 
Parameter   II.a (pooled)     II.b (egalitarian)     II.c (hierarch)     II.d (individualist)   
ASC1 (C/T)  0.0658      (0.2034)   0.9229*     (0.4748)  -0.1236      (0.4730)  -0.4604      (0.5457)  
Standard deviation (SD)  2.9537*** (0.2524)  3.3963*** (0.6184)  3.5235*** (0.5956)  4.2716*** (0.6922) 
ASC2 (SWI)  0.4760**   (0.2018)   1.4948*** (0.4513)   0.4214      (0.4728)   0.1092      (0.5317)  
SD  2.9726*** (0.2643)  2.7993*** (0.6390)  3.5864*** (0.5952)  4.2062*** (0.7092) 
Buffer  0.0059*** (0.0022)   0.0011      (0.0050)   0.0130**   (0.0052)   0.0037      (0.0054)  
SD  0.0099*** (0.0028)  0.0249*** (0.0057)  0.0263*** (0.0058)  0.0139**   (0.0064) 
Quality  0.0230*** (0.0065)   0.0245*     (0.0146)   0.0198      (0.0144)   0.0522*** (0.0187)  
SD  0.0584*** (0.0103)  0.0855*** (0.0226)  0.0428*    (0.0219)  0.1400*** (0.0221) 
Jobs  0.0075**   (0.0035)  -0.0018      (0.0079)   0.0183**   (0.0086)   0.0047      (0.0091)  
SD  0.0175*** (0.0050)  0.0376*** (0.0114)  0.0436*** (0.0105)  0.0456*** (0.0133) 
Infrastructure  0.0105*     (0.0055)   0.0291**   (0.0120)   0.0028      (0.0130)   0.0187      (0.0147)  
SD  0.0417*** (0.0089)  0.0558*** (0.0158)  0.0695*** (0.0167)  0.0683*** (0.0241) 
Wildlife  0.0061      (0.0056)   0.0100      (0.0120)  -0.0137      (0.0127)   0.0069      (0.0145)  
SD  0.0452*** (0.0094)  0.0672*** (0.0200)  0.0445*** (0.0173)  0.0597**   (0.0261) 
ASC1 x Narrative  0.2943      (0.3308) 
 
 0.4631      (0.7805) 
 
 0.7006      (0.7848) 
 
-0.3452      (0.8909) 
 
ASC2 x Narrative  0.1303      (0.3319) 
 
 0.2866      (0.7442) 
 
 0.5300      (0.7874) 
 
-0.6083      (0.8851) 
 
Buffer x Narrative  0.0034      (0.0034) 
 
 0.0189**   (0.0083) 
 
-0.0053      (0.0086) 
 
 0.0046      (0.0089) 
 
Quality x Narrative -0.0009      (0.0101) 
 
-0.0170      (0.0234) 
 
-0.0081      (0.0227) 
 
-0.0025      (0.0296) 
 
Jobs x Narrative -0.0004      (0.0056) 
 
 0.0145      (0.0128) 
 
-0.0268*    (0.0139) 
 
 0.0067      (0.0150) 
 
Infrastructure x Narrative  0.0048      (0.0085) 
 
-0.0131      (0.0196) 
 
 0.0186      (0.0208) 
 
 0.0028      (0.0225) 
 
Wildlife x Narrative  0.0088      (0.0087) 
 
-0.0053      (0.0194) 
 
 0.0659*** (0.0201) 
 
 0.0210      (0.0227) 
 
Cost -0.0056*** (0.0003)   -0.0070*** (0.0008)   -0.0077*** (0.0008)   -0.0088*** (0.0010)   
Log L -8829.6  -1934.1  -1961.6  -1884.4  
N 29190  6690  7695  6570  
AIC 17745.2   3954.3   4009.2   3854.8   
Note: Standard Errors are given in parentheses. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%  
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Table 8. Results of Likelihood Ratio tests between specification I and specification II 
Hypotheses (H0: 𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒 −  𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶−𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒 = 0) χ² (p-value) Conclusion 
Pooled 12.07 (p=0.098) Reject (at 10%) 
Egalitarian 12.18 (p=0.095) Reject (at 10%) 
Hierarch 20.88 (p=0.004) Reject (at 1%) 
Individualist   4.83 (p=0.681) Fail to reject 
 
show that we reject the null hypotheses for Egalitarians (10% level) and Hierarchs (1% level) 
and conclude that specification II is preferred over specification I.  This indicates a significant 
influence from the cultural narrative on groundwater preferences, and interaction terms provide 
evidence for an incongruency effect. 
Main effects for Model II.b indicate that Egalitarians exhibit significant positive 
preferences for both C/T and SWI policy alternatives and also significantly value water quality 
provision and subsidence avoidance (infrastructure integrity).  Mean coefficients show greater 
preference for the SWI alternative compared to C/T, while standard deviations show SWI 
preferences are also less variable than C/T preferences.  Model II.c demonstrates that Hierarchs 
value jobs from agriculture and (drought) buffer but possess no preference for either of the 
proposed policy alternatives.  Coefficients for buffer and jobs show mean preferences of similar 
magnitude, while individual preferences for jobs vary twice as much as preferences for 
groundwater buffer. 
The interaction terms in Model II.b (Egalitarians) and Model II.c (Hierarchs) provide 
evidence for a cultural incongruency effect due to narrative framing.  For example, those 
Hierarchs who see the individualist cultural narrative demonstrate significantly lower preference 
for the “jobs from agriculture” groundwater service compared to Hierarchs in the control group.  
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This comports with our prediction that non-individualist types will show diminished preference 
for attributes related to commerce and industry in response to the incongruent individualist 
narrative frame.  We also predict that these groups will show increased preference for other 
groundwater attributes not so directly related to commerce and industry.  Model II.c shows that 
Hierarchs in the narrative treatment do exhibit significantly greater preference for wildlife 
services relative to the control group.  All other interaction terms, including those for the ASC’s, 
indicate no change in preference in response to the narrative frame, still consistent with the 
theorized prediction for incongruence (Table 1 and Table 2). 
Similar framing effects indicating incongruency are evident among Egalitarians in Model 
II.b.  In particular, those exposed to the individualist narrative frame show significantly greater 
preference for groundwater buffer.  Preference for jobs does not differ from those in the control 
group.  As with Hierarchs, all other interaction terms indicate no change in preference.           
Discussion 
 This study attempts to build on several weak areas in the literatures relating to 
environmental economics, the NPF, and climate change policy.  First, consideration for narrative 
framing effects is largely absent in the environmental economics literature eliciting stated 
preferences for environmental policies.  Relating to the NPF, few empirical studies measure 
policy preferences in response to generalizable narrative form and content (see McMorris et al., 
2018; Zanocco et al., 2018), and none uses a CE to explore preference heterogeneity or tradeoffs 
related to policy attributes.  We fill this gap and use a CE to measure policy preferences in 
response to a structuralist narrative imbued with content using CT.  Finally, there are few studies 
about climate change perception that acknowledge the distinction between policies targeting 
controversial causes of climate change (e.g., CO2 emissions) and other policies mitigating long-
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term consequences.  The distinction is important to public policy as governments respond to 
climate change.  We add to the literature by conducting a CE to estimate public preferences for 
long-term groundwater management policies and the groundwater services under threat from 
climate change. 
We find that egalitarian types and hierarchical types demonstrate evidence of a cultural 
incongruency effect in their groundwater preferences in response to an individualist cultural 
narrative frame.  Hierarchs show strengthened preference for wildlife service provision and 
lower preference for the provision of jobs from agriculture.  Egalitarians show greater preference 
for groundwater buffer.  On the other hand, we fail to confirm the hypothesis that individualist 
types demonstrate a cultural congruency effect in response to the same narrative frame.  This 
could be evidence that people respond more strongly to incongruence than to congruence in the 
case of groundwater policy preferences.  Another possible explanation is that the C/T policy 
alternative might not be completely congruent with the individualist worldview.  In particular, 
the government cap on groundwater pumping that facilitates the C/T permit market could run 
counter to individualist preferences, as the status quo essentially allows limitless pumping from 
the aquifer.  Based on the results of the ASC’s for the two policy preferences, only egalitarians 
clearly prefer a new policy to manage groundwater use beyond the status quo, so there is no clear 
evidence that individualists prefer a C/T alternative.  Another potentially important implication 
relates to the findings that hierarch types respond to narrative framing with increased preference 
for wildlife services.  Because these services support popular fishing and water fowl sports in the 
region, hierarch types in particular are perhaps more resolute in valuing the protection of these 
services when presented with free-market policy arguments.         
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Narrative frames about climate change will continue to influence individuals through the 
media, and this research is helpful to policy makers in determining how much, if any, these 
narratives affect people’s willingness to pay for mitigation measures.  We examine the role of 
narratives within preferences for alternative groundwater management due to the drier and hotter 
conditions anticipated from climate change.  Future studies might consider how narrative 
influences willingness to pay for other mitigation measures to cope with the consequences of 
climate change.  If narrative influences are strong and consistent across different contexts, then 
research might find effective ways to counteract, or subdue, that influence toward mitigation 
measures that best respond to the demands of climate change.  
In addition to building upon research into the NPF, this study is instructive for other 
policy frameworks such as the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (see Sabatier and Weible 
2007).  By conducting sub-sample analyses for each CT type, we provide informative evidence 
toward several components and linkages within the ACF.  First, we offer evidence into how 
groups of like-minded people (defined by CT type) respond to a cultural narrative in the case of 
groundwater policy preferences.  Our study is limited, however, in its ability to link the NPF and 
ACF using empirical evidence because we sample the general population and not actors within 
the policy subsystem.  This is a critical shortcoming as relates to the ACF.  However, in studying 
the general public we do offer evidence into the ACF feedback linkage between system 
outcomes (groundwater service levels) and public opinion (public groundwater and policy 
preferences), which exerts external force upon the policy subsystem (Sabatier and Weible 2007).  
Future research should sample groups of actors within the groundwater policy subsystem to 
provide formal evidence into how the NPF applies to the ACF, and more importantly, policy 
change.  Sampling farmers, who are the primary groundwater users, is an important next step. 
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One of the drawbacks of CEs like ours that measure environmental preferences is the 
amount of background information and scenario details that must be communicated to a survey 
respondent about a hypothetical future outcome.  Though we check that respondents to our CE 
read the questionnaire text, it may be that other ways of communicating information would elicit 
different responses, and future studies should test this.  For example, the ability to communicate 
future environmental outcomes in an immersive fashion via Virtual Reality could make those 
outcomes more salient and elicit a more sensitive response (see Matthews et al. 2017, Fang et al. 
2019).  Notwithstanding our study’s limitations, we present some of the first evidence into how 
narrative framing about climate change impacts public preferences for groundwater services and 
long-term groundwater management policy. 
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Conclusion 
 I presented three empirical studies that address complementary questions related to 
groundwater resources management policy through a variety of salient methods for modeling 
market and non-market groundwater benefits and costs.  Chapter I used a spatially dynamic 
economic modeling and optimization framework to examine the limits of groundwater outcome 
improvements under new management technologies and policies that leverage market-based 
incentives.  The results suggest that policies solely targeting economic efficiency are insufficient 
to counter trends of long-term aquifer declines.  These findings are robust to sensitivity analysis 
under a range of parameter values.  My results support those from other recent studies arguing 
that, in the case of irrigation efficiency, improvements may actually lead to increased 
groundwater use rather than conservation (Grafton et al., 2018; Pfeiffer and Lin, 2014; Ward and 
Pulido-Velazquez, 2008).  Notably, I find evidence that improved irrigation efficiency programs 
induce farmers in many cases to plant more water-intensive crops such as rice that garner higher 
profit margins but lead to increases in water use. 
In Chapter II, I integrated existing elements from Meyer (2013a; 2013b) and Train (2016; 
Train and Weeks, 2005) into new specifications of choice models to jointly estimate public WTP 
for groundwater services and alternative management policies together with endogenous 
discount rates using flexible mixing distributions for the random parameters.  Marginal WTP 
results illuminate significant public WTP for the non-market benefits of water quality provision 
and buffer against long-term drought, as well as for the provision of jobs from agriculture and 
wildlife habitat provision that promotes fishing and duck hunting.  I estimated a mean annual 
exponential discount rate of roughly 73%, consistent with literature-wide findings about high 
individual discount rates.  I leveraged flexible mixing distributions in the estimation of 
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endogenous individual time preferences to revisit Meyer’s (2013a) and Lew’s (2018) 
comparisons of discounting functional forms using CE data.  While Meyer (2013a) and Lew 
(2018) found no evidence to reject the exponential model, I find evidence with more flexible 
models that most individuals tend to deviate from exponential discounting.  Importantly, I find 
that the form of discounting assumed could influence estimated net present values in policy 
analysis, potentially dictating whether to implement new policy alternatives.  
The final chapter examined treatment effects within mixed logit models given exposure 
to a culturally-biased narrative frame about climate change.  I used theories about cultural risk 
perception and motivated reasoning to evaluate systematic effects in response to the 
individualistic cultural frame.  Findings show that egalitarian and hierarchical types display 
evidence of a cultural incongruency effect while individualistic types show no effect.  This could 
be evidence that people respond more strongly to incongruence than to congruence in the case of 
groundwater policy preferences.  However, future research is necessary to determine whether a 
policy alternative other than C/T might exhibit greater congruence with the individualistic 
worldview.  Few empirical studies measure policy preferences in response to generalizable 
narrative form and content (see McMorris et al., 2018; Zanocco et al., 2018), and none uses a CE 
to explore preference heterogeneity or tradeoffs related to policy attributes.  I fill this gap by 
conducting a CE to measure policy preferences in response to a structuralist narrative imbued 
with content using CT.  Beyond the empirical value offered for research into the NPF, Chapter 
III is instructive for scholars of the ACF.  Evidence as to how different types of people (defined 
by CT type) respond to a cultural narrative in the case of groundwater policy preferences can 
help to explain patterns of behaviour within advocacy coalitions, and future research to sample 
relevant actors within the groundwater policy subsystem is warranted. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Appendix A contains supplementary material for Chapter II.  This includes the ‘cheap talk’ and 
‘consequentiality’ scripts used in the survey instrument to foster incentive compatibility.  This 
also includes detailed sample demographics (Table A1) to support the general validity of the 
study.  Tables A2-A5 report the bootstrap 95% confidence intervals used to compute standard 
errors for the D-LML models (best supports) in Chapter II.  Table A6 presents the simulated 
maximum likelihood results of the D-MXL models.  Table A7 shows the simulated maximum 
likelihood results of the D-LML models using the 2SD decision rule and the D-MXL results to 
inform the parameter supports.  Figures A1-A4 depict the corresponding marginal WTP and time 
parameter distributions for the D-LML models (2SD supports).          
Cheap Talk Script in Survey Instrument 
For the following questions, ASSUME you are making voting decisions for a state 
referendum.  In each question, please indicate your preferred alternative given the different 
attribute levels and cost. 
Be Aware:  Studies show that people tend to act differently when they face hypothetical 
decisions.  In other words, they say one thing and do something different.  For example, some 
people state a policy they would support at a given cost, but when the policy is actually under 
consideration as an election ballot measure, they will not vote for it at the cost they said they 
would support.  We want you to behave in the same way that you would if you really were 
considering an election ballot measure with real tax consequences. 
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Consequentiality Script and Comprehension Check in Survey Instrument 
We want to know how people think groundwater resources should be managed in the Mississippi 
River Valley alluvial aquifer (MRVA).  Findings from this survey will be shared with the 
Arkansas Natural Resources Commission (ANRC) and other stakeholders and might affect how 
Arkansas actually manages its groundwater resources.  Your responses and those from 
other participants will not solely determine the implementation of new groundwater management 
policy, but they will be used as advice on whether to implement such policy.  The likelihood that 
a particular alternative is implemented could increase with the number of "yes" votes for that 
alternative. 
According to the above paragraph, which of the following is true about your responses on this 
survey? 
a. Responses will have no impact on groundwater management policy in Arkansas. 
b. Responses will be used as advice on whether to implement groundwater management 
policy in Arkansas. 
c. Responses will be used to completely inform groundwater management policy in 
Arkansas. 
Sample Demographics 
Table A1. Sample demographics and Arkansas population statistics 
Characteristic MRVA Survey Sample Arkansas 
 Median Age 42 38 
(standard deviation) (15.31) 
 
Percent Female 66.0 51.5 
(standard error) (0.017) 
 
Mean persons per household 2.86 2.53 
(standard deviation) (1.27) 
 
Median household income $ 40,000 - $ 49,000 $ 45,869 
- - 
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Table A1 (Cont.) 
Characteristic MRVA Survey Sample Arkansas 
 Percent bachelor's degree or higher 30.1 23.4 
(standard error) (0.016)  
Percent married 57.8 49.2 
(standard error) (0.018)  
Percent Unemployed 4.4 5.6 
(standard error) (0.007)   
Note: Arkansas population statistics come from the US Census Bureau’s 2017 American 
Community Survey. 
 
Bootstrap 95% Confidence Intervals 
Table A2. Bootstrap 95% confidence intervals for the random time parameter and WTP 
parameters of Model I.a (D-LML with Exponential discounting) 
  
Parameter   Mean (lower) Mean (upper) St. Deviation (lower) St. Deviation (upper) 
ASC1 (C/T) -1.6382 2.2772 6.2738 7.9793 
ASC2 (SWI) 1.5270 4.1549 5.4300 6.8591 
Buffer 0.2364 1.6719 1.5468 2.2424 
Quality 0.7605 4.7971 4.8783 7.3532 
Jobs 0.2605 0.4047 0.1508 0.2193 
Infrastructure -2.8679 1.2646 4.9685 6.9854 
Wildlife 0.7372 5.3826 5.7254 8.3260 
𝜆𝜆 (scale) 0.2765 0.7429 0.2176 0.5078 
r 0.6303 0.8197 0.2123 0.3063 
 
Table A3. Bootstrap 95% confidence intervals for the random time parameter and WTP 
parameters of Model I.b (D-LML with Harvey hyperbolic discounting) 
  
Parameter   Mean (lower) Mean (upper) St. Deviation (lower) St. Deviation (upper) 
ASC1 (C/T) -2.4100 0.7562 4.1846 5.7113 
ASC2 (SWI) -0.1939 3.0030 4.5830 5.9466 
Buffer 0.0528 0.4312 0.3314 0.5115 
Quality 0.1946 0.4928 0.2609 0.4061 
Jobs 0.1911 0.1993 0.0067 0.0111 
Infrastructure 0.3559 0.8769 0.6657 1.0031 
Wildlife 0.0426 0.1224 0.0624 0.1006 
𝜆𝜆 (scale) 1.7204 2.6179 0.9312 1.5302 
u 1.2154 1.5195 0.3133 0.5393 
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Table A4. Bootstrap 95% confidence intervals for the random time parameter and WTP 
parameters of Model I.c (D-LML with HM hyperbolic discounting) 
  
Parameter   Mean (lower) Mean (upper) St. Deviation (lower) St. Deviation (upper) 
ASC1 (C/T) -1.2501 2.3366 5.3628 7.0797 
ASC2 (SWI) 1.3520 4.5694 4.7336 6.3700 
Buffer 0.0394 0.2507 0.2463 0.3604 
Quality 0.2500 0.5664 0.2934 0.4496 
Jobs 0.1503 0.1693 0.0169 0.0269 
Infrastructure 0.0158 0.4915 0.5444 0.8343 
Wildlife 0.1716 0.6193 0.5705 0.8746 
𝜆𝜆 (scale) 1.1981 2.0149 0.8981 1.3002 
w 1.6302 1.8033 0.1708 0.2598 
 
Table A5. Bootstrap 95% confidence intervals for the random time parameters and WTP 
parameters of Model I.d (D-LML with QH discounting) 
  
Parameter   Mean (lower) Mean (upper) St. Deviation (lower) St. Deviation (upper) 
ASC1 (C/T) -2.0861 1.2693 6.9635 8.9172 
ASC2 (SWI) -0.0222 2.8903 8.6151 11.134 
Buffer 0.3749 1.9348 1.8013 2.7945 
Quality 0.1550 2.7458 2.7864 4.1345 
Jobs 0.6483 0.6743 0.0309 0.0429 
Infrastructure -1.9425 2.5695 3.4595 5.9618 
Wildlife 0.0685 1.6832 1.5652 2.3849 
𝜆𝜆 (scale) 0.0768 0.1159 0.0666 0.0909 
r 0.4678 0.6405 0.1866 0.2774 
β 0.5881 0.7483 0.1496 0.2356 
 
D-MXL Model Results 
Table A6.  Simulated maximum likelihood results of the D-MXL models in WTP-space 
Parameter 
 
  A6.a (Exp.)   A6.b (Harvey)   A6.c (HM)   A6.d (QH) 
ASC1 (C/T) -0.0451       (0.0737) -1.4382*** (0.0465) -1.2639*** (0.0466) -1.0080*** (0.0381) 
St. deviation (SD)  5.1952*** (0.0186)  4.2721*** (0.0203)  3.9935*** (0.0063)  5.3552*** (0.1049) 
ASC2 (SWI)  1.6471*** (0.0801)  0.9755*** (0.0439)  0.9457*** (0.0485)  0.9208*** (0.0943) 
SD  4.4645*** (0.0151)  4.0846*** (0.0160)  4.8280*** (0.0144)  4.3347*** (0.1012) 
Buffer  0.6327*** (0.0192)  0.1057*** (0.0022)  0.0992*** (0.0019)  0.5481*** (0.0715) 
SD  1.6237*** (0.0180)  0.4652*** (0.0036)  0.3056*** (0.0019)  1.5920*** (0.0498) 
Quality  0.9968*** (0.0383)  0.3271*** (0.0042)  0.3246*** (0.0084)  0.8460*** (0.0571) 
SD  6.4774*** (0.0726)  0.3463*** (0.0046)  0.3605*** (0.0031)  3.3067*** (0.0972) 
Jobs  0.4315*** (0.0220)  0.1957*** (0.0033)  0.1996*** (0.0029)  0.6964*** (0.0243) 
SD  0.0073       (0.0058)  0.0086*** (0.0009)  0.0033*** (0.0006)  0.0105       (0.0441) 
Infrastructure -0.8254*** (0.0187) -0.1130*** (0.0043) -0.0758*** (0.0051) -0.2921*** (0.0611) 
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Table A6 (Cont.) 
Parameter 
 
  A6.a (Exp.)   A6.b (Harvey)   A6.c (HM)   A6.d (QH) 
SD  5.3070*** (0.0706)  1.0257*** (0.0075)  0.7410*** (0.0086)  4.8633*** (0.0327) 
Wildlife -0.1556*** (0.0198)  0.1041*** (0.0049)  0.0894*** (0.0054)  0.6078*** (0.1242) 
SD  8.3207*** (0.1005)  0.0882*** (0.0016)  0.7242*** (0.0072)  1.8295*** (0.1053) 
𝜆𝜆 (scale) -1.6396*** (0.2415) -1.7174*** (0.2467) -1.5832*** (0.1795) -1.2233*** (0.3389) 
SD  4.8823*** (0.8507)  6.0073*** (1.2113)  5.8371*** (0.8364)  6.7316*** (1.8009) 
r  0.4910*** (0.0054)     0.4129*** (0.0093) 
SD  0.0005       (0.0014)     0.0051       (0.0044) 
u   1.2054*** (0.0040)   
SD   0.0055*** (0.0011)   
w    1.4616*** (0.0160)  
SD    0.0031       (0.0079)  
β     0.9951*** (0.0827) 
SD    - 
Log L -3531.7  -3574.6  -3562.5  -3541.9  
AIC 7099.4 7185.2 7161.0 7121.8 
N 11655 11655 11655 11655 
Note: WTP values are reported as WTP/10.  Multiply estimates by 10 to obtain dollar amounts. 
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1% 
 
D-LML Model Results (2SD Supports)  
Table A7.  Simulated maximum likelihood results of the D-LML models in WTP-space (2SD 
supports) 
 
Parameter   A7.a (Exp.)   A7.b (Harvey)   A7.c (HM)   A7.d (QH) 
ASC1 (C/T) -1.0258   (0.9041) -0.2177* (0.7808) -0.9943   (0.8121) -2.5428* (1.2276) 
St. deviation (SD)  6.3239* (0.3468)  5.0518* (0.3561)  4.9056* (0.4146)  6.6602* (0.6030) 
ASC2 (SWI)  1.4193* (0.7850)  1.4020   (0.7892)  0.0886   (0.8424)  1.0325   (1.0438) 
SD  6.1815* (0.3065)  5.1448* (0.3665)  5.6457* (0.4321)  5.6879* (0.3334) 
Buffer  0.4877* (0.2822)  0.1592   (0.0884)  0.1876* (0.0615)  0.6636   (0.3547) 
SD  1.7617* (0.1231)  0.3954* (0.0484)  0.3186* (0.0300)  1.8740* (0.1518) 
Quality  0.8684   (1.1443)  0.4081* (0.0867)  0.2347* (0.0779)  0.8460   (0.0571) 
SD  6.2084* (0.4524)  0.3630* (0.0361)  0.3835* (0.0373)  3.3067* (0.0972) 
Jobs  0.4324* (0.0013)  0.1954* (0.0022)  0.1997* (0.0008)  0.6962* (0.0025) 
SD  0.0083* (0.0005)  0.0107* (0.0010)  0.0041* (0.0004)  0.0116* (0.0009) 
Infrastructure -1.0078   (0.9297)  0.3983* (0.1465)  0.3591   (0.1218)  9.7430* (0.0336) 
SD  5.8801* (0.3614)  0.8752* (0.0890)  0.7114* (0.0654)  0.1739* (0.0072) 
Wildlife  0.4659   (1.4026)  0.1486* (0.0206)  0.2639* (0.1243)  0.0562   (0.4349) 
SD  7.6474* (0.5570)  0.0965* (0.0095)  0.8174* (0.0732)  2.1128* (0.1673) 
𝜆𝜆 (scale)  3.5899* (1.2635)  2.5254* (0.4330)  2.8248* (0.6604)  0.9390* (0.7408) 
SD  2.4406* (0.7499)  1.7964* (0.3284)  3.0019* (0.8514)  1.8130* (0.8128) 
r  0.4910* (0.0001)     0.4133* (0.0009) 
SD  0.0006* (0.0000)     0.0059* (0.0004) 
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Table A7 (Cont.) 
Parameter   A7.a (Exp.)   A7.b (Harvey)   A7.c (HM)   A7.d (QH) 
u   1.2036* (0.0014)   
SD   0.0049* (0.0007)   
w    1.4613* (0.0007)  
SD    0.0034* (0.0003)  
β     0.9809   (0.0151) 
SD     0.0938* (0.0068) 
Log L -3648.9 -3472.6  -3469.2  -3876.6  
AIC 7529.7 7177.2 7170.4 8003.1 
N 11655 11655 11655 11655 
Note: WTP values are reported as WTP/10.  Multiply estimates by 10 to obtain dollar amounts. 
Note: Bootstrap Standard Errors given in parentheses were obtained using 250 Bootstrap 
samples. 
*significant based on Bootstrap 95% CI 
 
 
Figure A1.  Estimated distributions of the time parameters and marginal WTPs (exponential 
model A7.a) 
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Figure A2.  Estimated distributions of the time parameters and marginal WTPs (Harvey model 
A7.b) 
 
 
Figure A3.  Estimated distributions of the time parameters and marginal WTPs (HM model 
A7.c) 
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Figure A4.  Estimated distributions of the time parameters and marginal WTPs (QH model 
A7.d) 
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Appendix B 
Appendix B contains supplementary material for Chapter III.  Below is a copy of the 
individualistic cultural narrative used in the experiment.  I also include here a complete list of the 
survey questions used to evaluate each respondent’s cultural type and the results of the Principal 
Components analysis (Tables B1and B2) employed in that classification.  To support the general 
validity of the study, I also share detailed sample demographics (Table B3).  Table B4 shows the 
multinomial logit (MNL) results that were used as starting values for the mixed logit models 
reported in Chapter III.       
Individualistic Cultural Narrative about Climate Change 
As you can see, groundwater availability in the MRVA is declining, and the resource depletion 
threatens the economic and environmental services that are supported by the MRVA.  The 
prospect of having more severe droughts as a result of climate change threatens to make the 
problem worse.  It is apparent that sustainable groundwater management in Arkansas is 
necessary.  However, despite the threats to crucial economic and environmental services, real 
progress in achieving sustainable groundwater management has been made nearly impossible by 
the efforts of destructive interests. 
Environmental advocates, represented by organizations like Greenpeace and the radical 
Earth-First!, are attempting to use water scarcity problems and climate change to destroy our 
capitalist system.  These groups demand radical policies that destroy free competition and reduce 
our individual quality of life.  These groups put faith in socialized community-owned resources, 
invasive laws, and the more dangerous positions advocate diverting and storing water resources 
with government-funded projects where authority rests with a central manager.  They argue that 
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due to the failure of free markets, only planned water resource solutions can be trusted to combat 
water scarcity and the problems of climate change.  
It is clear that radical environmental types are using the facts about groundwater scarcity 
and climate change to push a destructive agenda that obstructs any meaningful solutions to the 
problem.  To solve this problem we must invoke the value that has always served humans the 
best; that value is our historical reliance on free competition.  The innovative Cap-and-Trade 
solution relies on this value by taking advantage of free competition to generate groundwater 
conservation most efficiently and shift pumping patterns toward the most valuable uses of 
groundwater.  Thankfully organizations like the Cato Institute and Wall Street Journal have been 
tirelessly advocating for this solution. 
The Cap-and-Trade groundwater market solution reduces the overall amount of 
groundwater pumping, as private firms are limited by how much they can pump.  Each firm can 
buy, sell, or trade unused pumping allocations within the overall pumping limits.  So, if a firm 
pumps less groundwater than what its permits would allow, it may sell or trade its permits to a 
firm that produces more.  This solution lets firms that have traditionally used more groundwater 
buy from those that use less.  The benefit of the Cap-and-Trade solution is that firms will have 
time to adapt to a more environmentally-sustainable economy while also competing with firms 
that find creative ways to cut costs and reduce groundwater pumping. 
The problem of water scarcity, and its potential exacerbation due to climate change, 
reminds us all that the world is rapidly changing.  When change turns for the worse, it can only 
get better if we are free to adapt.  The Cap-and-Trade solution provides a clear path for private 
firms to freely adapt, innovate, and ultimately achieve sustainable groundwater 
management.  Radical ideology and socialist environmental solutions are not the answer.    
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List of CT Survey Questions 
We asked respondents the following in order to evaluate each respondent’s cultural type: 
Using a scale from 1 (Disagree) to 7 (Agree), please indicate to what extent you agree with the 
following statements. 
1. Our society is in trouble because we don’t obey those in authority. 
2. The best way to get ahead in life is to do what you are told to do. 
3. It would be pointless to make serious plans in such an uncertain world. 
4. Society works best if power is shared equally. 
5. We are all better off when we compete as individuals. 
6. Even the disadvantaged should have to make their own way in the world. 
7. It is our responsibility to reduce the differences in income between the rich and the poor. 
8. No matter how hard we try, the course of our lives is largely determined by forces outside our 
control. 
9. Even if some people are at a disadvantage, it is best for society to let people succeed or fail on 
their own. 
10. Most of the important things that take place in life happen by random chance. 
11. What our society needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal. 
12. Society would be much better off if we imposed strict and swift punishment on those that 
break the rules. 
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Principal Components Analysis 
Table B1. Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability Measures 
Cultural Type CT Questions Cronbach’s Alpha 
Egalitarian 4, 7, and 11 0.77 
Hierarch 1, 2, and 12 0.68 
Individualist 5, 6, and 9 0.68 
Fatalist 3, 8, and 10 0.69 
 
Table B2. PCA Loadings 
  
RC4 RC1 RC2 RC3 
CT Question 1 -0.06 0.16 0.13 0.82 
CT Question 2 0.08 0.33 0.14 0.68 
CT Question 3 0.1 0.77 0.11 0.17 
CT Question 4 0.82 0.1 0.06 0.01 
CT Question 5 -0.11 0.15 0.72 0.09 
CT Question 6 0.02 0.03 0.76 0.2 
CT Question 7 0.78 0.22 -0.11 0.01 
CT Question 8 0.25 0.71 0 0.12 
CT Question 9 -0.08 0.08 0.78 0.2 
CT Question 10 0.25 0.72 0.17 0.03 
CT Question 11 0.78 0.28 -0.16 0.08 
CT Question 12 0.09 -0.08 0.27 0.72 
 
 
SS loadings 2.05 1.93 1.89 1.8 
Proportion Var 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15 
Cumulative Var 0.17 0.33 0.49 0.64 
Proportion Explained 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.23 
Cumulative Proportion 0.27 0.52 0.77 1 
 
Sample Demographics 
 
Table B3. Sample demographics and Arkansas population statistics 
Characteristic MRVA Survey Sample Arkansas 
 Median Age 43 38 
(standard deviation) (15.51) 
 
Percent Female 65.6 51.5 
(standard error) (0.011) 
 
Mean persons per household 2.80 2.53 
(standard deviation) (1.27) 
 
Median household income $ 40,000 - $ 49,000 $ 45,869 
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Table B3 (Cont.) 
Characteristic MRVA Survey Sample Arkansas 
 - - 
 
Percent bachelor's degree or higher 31.7 23.4 
(standard error) (0.011) 
 
Percent married 55.5 49.2 
(standard error) (0.011) 
 
Percent Unemployed 4.9 5.6 
(standard error) (0.005)   
Note: Arkansas population statistics come from the US Census Bureau’s 2017 American 
Community Survey. 
 
MNL 
Table B4. Multinomial logit results using pooled data 
Parameter   I.a (pooled) 
ASC1 (C/T)  -0.2741***  (0.1058) 
ASC2 (SWI)  -0.0180        (0.1055) 
Buffer  0.0071***   (0.0013) 
Quality  0.0111***   (0.0036) 
Jobs  0.0058***   (0.0021) 
Infrastructure  0.0044         (0.0049) 
Wildlife  0.0079**     (0.0031) 
Cost -0.0039***   (0.0002) 
Log L -10476.3 
N 29190 
AIC 20968.6 
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Appendix C 
IRB Approval Letter 
 
Figure C1. Copy of Letter 
 
 
